InfoDotInc / archive systemEstablished online record · rebuilding deliberately
InfoDotInc

Technical documents, historic paths, and source-backed reference material.

Archive / FAA Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge / Pilot’s Handbook: Chapter 2 — Aeronautical Decision-Making

Chapter 2, Part 1

Aeronautical Decision-Making — Part 1

FAA-H-8083-25C (2023)

Introduction

Aeronautical decision-making (ADM) is decision-making

in a unique environment—aviation. It is a systematic

approach to the mental process used by pilots to consistently

determine the best course of action in response to a given set

of circumstances. It is what a pilot intends to do based on the

latest information he or she has.

Aeronautical

Decision-Making

Chapter 2

Figure 2-1. The percentage of aviation accidents as they relate to the different phases of flight. Note that the greatest percentage of

accidents take place during a minor percentage of the total flight.

Flight Time

2%

Flight Time

83%

Flight Time

15%

Preflights/

Taxi

Takeoff/

Initial Climb Climb Cruise Descent Maneuvering Approach Landing Other

3.3%

3.5%

23.4%

15.7%

2.6%

13%

9.7%

24.1%

4.7%

Percentage of General Aviation Accidents

The importance of learning and understanding effective

ADM skills cannot be overemphasized. While progress is

continually being made in the advancement of pilot training

methods, aircraft equipment and systems, and services

for pilots, accidents still occur. Despite all the changes in

technology to improve flight safety, one factor remains the

same: the human factor which leads to errors. It is estimated

that approximately 80 percent of all aviation accidents are

related to human factors and the vast majority of these

accidents occur during landing (24.1 percent) and takeoff

(23.4 percent). [Figure 2-1]

ADM is a systematic approach to risk assessment and stress

management. To understand ADM is to also understand

how personal attitudes can influence decision-making and

how those attitudes can be modified to enhance safety in the

flight deck. It is important to understand the factors that cause

humans to make decisions and how the decision-making

process not only works, but can be improved.

This chapter focuses on helping the pilot improve his or

her ADM skills with the goal of mitigating the risk factors

associated with flight. Advisory Circular (AC) 60-22,

“Aeronautical Decision-Making,” provides background

references, definitions, and other pertinent information about

ADM training in the general aviation (GA) environment.

[Figure 2-2]

History of ADM

For over 25 years, the importance of good pilot judgment, or

aeronautical decision-making (ADM), has been recognized

as critical to the safe operation of aircraft, as well as accident

avoidance. The airline industry, motivated by the need to

reduce accidents caused by human factors, developed the first

training programs based on improving ADM. Crew resource

management (CRM) training for flight crews is focused on

the effective use of all available resources: human resources,

hardware, and information supporting ADM to facilitate crew

cooperation and improve decision-making. The goal of all

flight crews is good ADM and the use of CRM is one way

to make good decisions.

Research in this area prompted the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) to produce training directed at

improving the decision-making of pilots and led to current

FAA regulations that require that decision-making be taught

as part of the pilot training curriculum. ADM research,

development, and testing culminated in 1987 with the

publication of six manuals oriented to the decision-making

needs of variously rated pilots. These manuals provided

multifaceted materials designed to reduce the number

of decision-related accidents. The effectiveness of these

materials was validated in independent studies where student

pilots received such training in conjunction with the standard

flying curriculum. When tested, the pilots who had received

ADM-training made fewer in-flight errors than those who had

Figure 2-2. Advisory Circular (AC) 60-22, “Aeronautical Decision Making,” carries a wealth of information for the pilot to learn.

not received ADM training. The differences were statistically

significant and ranged from about 10 to 50 percent fewer

judgment errors. In the operational environment, an operator

flying about 400,000 hours annually demonstrated a 54

percent reduction in accident rate after using these materials

for recurrency training.

Contrary to popular opinion, good judgment can be taught.

Tradition held that good judgment was a natural by-product

of experience, but as pilots continued to log accident-free

flight hours, a corresponding increase of good judgment

was assumed. Building upon the foundation of conventional

decision-making, ADM enhances the process to decrease the

probability of human error and increase the probability of a

safe flight. ADM provides a structured, systematic approach

to analyzing changes that occur during a flight and how these

changes might affect the safe outcome of a flight. The ADM

process addresses all aspects of decision-making in the flight

deck and identifies the steps involved in good decision-making.

Steps for good decision-making are:

1. Identifying personal attitudes hazardous to safe flight

2. Learning behavior modification techniques

3. Learning how to recognize and cope with stress

4. Developing risk assessment skills

5. Using all resources

6. Evaluating the effectiveness of one’s ADM skills

Risk Management

The goal of risk management is to proactively identify

safety-related hazards and mitigate the associated risks. Risk

management is an important component of ADM. When a

pilot follows good decision-making practices, the inherent risk

in a flight is reduced or even eliminated. The ability to make

good decisions is based upon direct or indirect experience

and education. The formal risk management decision-making

process involves six steps as shown in Figure 2-3.

Consider automotive seat belt use. In just two decades, seat

belt use has become the norm, placing those who do not

wear seat belts outside the norm, but this group may learn to

wear a seat belt by either direct or indirect experience. For

example, a driver learns through direct experience about the

value of wearing a seat belt when he or she is involved in a car

accident that leads to a personal injury. An indirect learning

experience occurs when a loved one is injured during a car

accident because he or she failed to wear a seat belt.

As you work through the ADM cycle, it is important to

remember the four fundamental principles of risk management.

Figure 2-3. Risk management decision-making process.

Identify

Hazards

Assess

Risks

Analyze

Controls

Make Control

Decisions

Monitor

Results

Use

Controls

START

RISK

MANAGEMENT

PROCESS

1. Accept no unnecessary risk. Flying is not possible

without risk, but unnecessary risk comes without a

corresponding return. If you are flying a new airplane

for the first time, you might determine that the risk

of making that flight in low visibility conditions is

unnecessary.

2. Make risk decisions at the appropriate level. Risk

decisions should be made by the person who can

develop and implement risk controls. Remember

that you are pilot-in-command, so never let anyone

else—not ATC and not your passengers—make risk

decisions for you.

3. Accept risk when benefits outweigh dangers (costs).

In any flying activity, it is necessary to accept some

degree of risk. A day with good weather, for example,

is a much better time to fly an unfamiliar airplane for

the first time than a day with low IFR conditions.

4. Integrate risk management into planning at all levels.

Because risk is an unavoidable part of every flight,

safety requires the use of appropriate and effective risk

management not just in the preflight planning stage,

but in all stages of the flight.

While poor decision-making in everyday life does not always

lead to tragedy, the margin for error in aviation is thin. Since

ADM enhances management of an aeronautical environment,

all pilots should become familiar with and employ ADM.

Crew Resource Management (CRM) and

Single-Pilot Resource Management

While CRM focuses on pilots operating in crew environments,

many of the concepts apply to single-pilot operations. Many

CRM principles have been successfully applied to single-pilot

aircraft and led to the development of Single-Pilot Resource

Management (SRM). SRM is defined as the art and science

of managing all the resources (both on-board the aircraft

and from outside sources) available to a single pilot (prior

to and during flight) to ensure the successful outcome of the

flight. SRM includes the concepts of ADM, risk management

(RM), task management (TM), automation management

(AM), controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) awareness, and

situational awareness (SA). SRM training helps the pilot

maintain situational awareness by managing the automation

and associated aircraft control and navigation tasks. This

enables the pilot to accurately assess and manage risk and

make accurate and timely decisions.

SRM is all about helping pilots learn how to gather

information, analyze it, and make decisions. Although the

flight is coordinated by a single person and not an onboard

flight crew, the use of available resources such as auto-pilot

and air traffic control (ATC) replicates the principles of CRM.

Hazard and Risk

Two defining elements of ADM are hazard and risk. Hazard

is a real or perceived condition, event, or circumstance that a

pilot encounters. When faced with a hazard, the pilot makes

an assessment of that hazard based upon various factors. The

pilot assigns a value to the potential impact of the hazard,

which qualifies the pilot’s assessment of the hazard—risk.

Therefore, risk is an assessment of the single or cumulative

hazard facing a pilot; however, different pilots see hazards

differently. For example, the pilot arrives to preflight and

discovers a small, blunt type nick in the leading edge at the

middle of the aircraft’s prop. Since the aircraft is parked on

the tarmac, the nick was probably caused by another aircraft’s

prop wash blowing some type of debris into the propeller.

The nick is the hazard (a present condition). The risk is prop

fracture if the engine is operated with damage to a prop blade.

The seasoned pilot may see the nick as a low risk. He

realizes this type of nick diffuses stress over a large area, is

located in the strongest portion of the propeller, and based

on experience; he does not expect it to propagate a crack that

can lead to high risk problems. He does not cancel his flight.

Figure 2-4. The five hazardous attitudes identified through past and contemporary study.

The Five Hazardous Attitudes Antidote

Anti-authority: “Don’t tell me.”

This attitude is found in people who do not like anyone telling them what to do. In a

sense, they are saying, “No one can tell me what to do.” They may be resentful of

having someone tell them what to do or may regard rules, regulations, and procedures

as silly or unnecessary. However, it is always your prerogative to question authority

if you feel it is in error.

Impulsivity: “Do it quickly.”

This is the attitude of people who frequently feel the need to do something, anything,

immediately. They do not stop to think about what they are about to do, they do not

select the best alternative, and they do the first thing that comes to mind.

Invulnerability: “It won’t happen to me.”

Many people falsely believe that accidents happen to others, but never to them. They

know accidents can happen, and they know that anyone can be affected. However,

they never really feel or believe that they will be personally involved. Pilots who think

this way are more likely to take chances and increase risk.

Macho: “I can do it.”

Pilots who are always trying to prove that they are better than anyone else think, “I can

do it—I'll show them.” Pilots with this type of attitude will try to prove themselves by

taking risks in order to impress others. While this pattern is thought to be a male

characteristic, women are equally susceptible.

Resignation: “What’s the use?”

Pilots who think, “What’s the use?” do not see themselves as being able to make a

great deal of difference in what happens to them. When things go well, the pilot is apt

to think that it is good luck. When things go badly, the pilot may feel that someone is

out to get them or attribute it to bad luck. The pilot will leave the action to others, for

better or worse. Sometimes, such pilots will even go along with unreasonable requests

just to be a "nice guy."

Follow the rules. They are usually right.

Not so fast. Think first.

It could happen to me.

Taking chances is foolish.

I’m not helpless. I can make a difference.

The inexperienced pilot may see the nick as a high risk factor

because he is unsure of the affect the nick will have on the

operation of the prop, and he has been told that damage to

a prop could cause a catastrophic failure. This assessment

leads him to cancel his flight.

Therefore, elements or factors affecting individuals are

different and profoundly impact decision-making. These

are called human factors and can transcend education,

experience, health, physiological aspects, etc.

Another example of risk assessment was the flight of a

Beechcraft King Air equipped with deicing and anti-icing.

The pilot deliberately flew into moderate to severe icing

conditions while ducking under cloud cover. A prudent pilot

would assess the risk as high and beyond the capabilities of

the aircraft, yet this pilot did the opposite. Why did the pilot

take this action?

Past experience prompted the action. The pilot had

successfully flown into these conditions repeatedly although

the icing conditions were previously forecast 2,000 feet above

the surface. This time, the conditions were forecast from the

surface. Since the pilot was in a hurry and failed to factor

in the difference between the forecast altitudes, he assigned

a low risk to the hazard and took a chance. He and the

passengers died from a poor risk assessment of the situation.

Hazardous Attitudes and Antidotes

Being fit to fly depends on more than just a pilot’s physical

condition and recent experience. For example, attitude

affects the quality of decisions. Attitude is a motivational

predisposition to respond to people, situations, or events in a

given manner. Studies have identified five hazardous attitudes

that can interfere with the ability to make sound decisions

and exercise authority properly: anti-authority, impulsivity,

invulnerability, macho, and resignation. [Figure 2-4]

Hazardous attitudes contribute to poor pilot judgment but

can be effectively counteracted by redirecting the hazardous

attitude so that correct action can be taken. Recognition of

hazardous thoughts is the first step toward neutralizing them.

After recognizing a thought as hazardous, the pilot should

label it as hazardous, then state the corresponding antidote.

Antidotes should be memorized for each of the hazardous

attitudes so they automatically come to mind when needed.

Figure 2-5. This risk matrix can be used for almost any operation

by assigning likelihood and consequence. In the case presented,

the pilot assigned a likelihood of occasional and the severity as

catastrophic. As one can see, this falls in the high risk area.

Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible

Improbable

Remote

Occasional

Probable

Risk Assessment Matrix

Likelihood

Severity

Serious LowMedium

Serious

SeriousHigh High

High

Risk

During each flight, the single pilot makes many decisions

under hazardous conditions. To fly safely, the pilot needs

to assess the degree of risk and determine the best course of

action to mitigate the risk.

Assessing Risk

For the single pilot, assessing risk is not as simple as it sounds.

For example, the pilot acts as his or her own quality control

in making decisions. If a fatigued pilot who has flown 16

hours is asked if he or she is too tired to continue flying, the

answer may be “no.” Most pilots are goal oriented and when

asked to accept a flight, there is a tendency to deny personal

limitations while adding weight to issues not germane to the

mission. For example, pilots of helicopter emergency services

(EMS) have been known (more than other groups) to make

flight decisions that add significant weight to the patient’s

welfare. These pilots add weight to intangible factors (the

patient in this case) and fail to appropriately quantify actual

hazards, such as fatigue or weather, when making flight

decisions. The single pilot who has no other crew member

for consultation must wrestle with the intangible factors that

draw one into a hazardous position. Therefore, he or she has

a greater vulnerability than a full crew.

Examining National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

reports and other accident research can help a pilot learn to

assess risk more effectively. For example, the accident rate

during night visual flight rules (VFR) decreases by nearly

50 percent once a pilot obtains 100 hours and continues to

decrease until the 1,000 hour level. The data suggest that for

the first 500 hours, pilots flying VFR at night might want to

establish higher personal limitations than are required by the

regulations and, if applicable, apply instrument flying skills

in this environment.

Several risk assessment models are available to assist in the

process of assessing risk. The models, all taking slightly

different approaches, seek a common goal of assessing risk

in an objective manner. The most basic tool is the risk matrix.

[Figure 2-5] It assesses two items: the likelihood of an event

occurring and the consequence of that event.

Likelihood of an Event

Likelihood is nothing more than taking a situation and

determining the probability of its occurrence. It is rated as

probable, occasional, remote, or improbable. For example, a

pilot is flying from point A to point B (50 miles) in marginal

visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions. The likelihood of

encountering potential instrument meteorological conditions

(IMC) is the first question the pilot needs to answer. The

experiences of other pilots, coupled with the forecast, might

cause the pilot to assign “occasional” to determine the

probability of encountering IMC.

The following are guidelines for making assignments.

• Probable—an event will occur several times

• Occasional—an event will probably occur sometime

• Remote—an event is unlikely to occur, but is possible

• Improbable—an event is highly unlikely to occur

Severity of an Event

The next element is the severity or consequence of a pilot’s

action(s). It can relate to injury and/or damage. If the

individual in the example above is not an instrument rated

pilot, what are the consequences of him or her encountering

inadvertent IMC conditions? In this case, because the pilot

is not IFR rated, the consequences are catastrophic. The

following are guidelines for this assignment.

• Catastrophic—results in fatalities, total loss

• Critical—severe injury, major damage

• Marginal—minor injury, minor damage

• Negligible—less than minor injury, less than minor

system damage

Simply connecting the two factors as shown in Figure 2-5

indicates the risk is high and the pilot must either not fly or

fly only after finding ways to mitigate, eliminate, or control

the risk.

Although the matrix in Figure 2-5 provides a general viewpoint

of a generic situation, a more comprehensive program can be

made that is tailored to a pilot’s flying. [Figure 2-6] This

program includes a wide array of aviation-related activities

specific to the pilot and assesses health, fatigue, weather,

RISK ASSESSMENT

Column total

Column total

SLEEP

1. Did not sleep well or less than 8 hours

2. Slept well

2

0

HOW DO YOU FEEL?

1. Have a cold or ill

2. Feel great

3. Feel a bit off

4

0

2

WEATHER AT TERMINATION

1. Greater than 5 miles visibility and 3,000 feet

ceilings

2. At least 3 miles visibility and 1,000 feet ceilings,

but less than 3,000 feet ceilings and 5 miles

visibility

3. IMC conditions

1

3

4

HOW IS THE DAY GOING?

1. Seems like one thing after another (late,

making errors, out of step)

2. Great day

3

0

IS THE FLIGHT

1. Day?

2. Night?

1

3

PLANNING

1. Rush to get off ground

2. No hurry

3. Used charts and computer to assist

4. Used computer program for all planning Yes

No

5. Did you verify weight and balance? Yes

No

6. Did you evaluate performance? Yes

No

7. Do you brief your passangers on the Yes

ground and in flight? No

3

1

0

3

0

0

3

0

3

0

2

Pilot’s Name Flight From To

TOTAL SCORE

0 10 20 30 Not complex flight Exercise caution Area of concern

Endangerment

Low risk

Figure 2-6. Example of a more comprehensive risk assessment program.

Original source PDFPublished from pages 1–7 of the recorded source chapter.
Open source PDF ↗