Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
Environment
• The weather system moving in from northwest Colorado is the main environmental hazard affecting the flight to
Santa Rosa. The presence of both convection and icing could increase the risk of loss of control, or if attempting to
stay underneath the clouds in VFR, the risk of CFIT.
• The high, rough terrain in this part of the southwest United States presents a hazard on the route to Santa Rosa. This
requires relatively high cruising altitudes which may approach the performance limits of her airplane.
• The departure airport has no ATC services, although fuel is available. ATC may limit the altitude selection en route,
which could limit an escape from icing conditions.
External Pressures
• The scheduled meetings back in Santa Rosa on Tuesday generate external pressures. The need to be present in
Durango on Monday narrows the departure window to Tuesday morning only. If these pressures are not mitigated, a
forced departure on Tuesday morning will mean dealing with the hazards and associated risks related to the pilot, the
aircraft, and the environment.
As Tricia tallies up the hazards and associated risks for the planned flight to Santa Rosa, she records them on the FRAT, as shown
in Figure 3-10. She needs to assess these risks in terms of their likelihood and severity. She strives to complete the risk analysis
so she can return and discuss the situation with the Smiths.
Figure 3-10. Case study FRAT with risks identified.
The risk assessment and mitigation for this case study will continue in Chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter Summary
Poor risk management is a common factor in many general aviation accidents. Pilots can use the PA VE checklist before flight
to identify hazards. Pilots can use a FRAT to organize identified hazards and associated risks for additional analysis.
Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
Introduction
Once hazards and their associated risks have been identified, they should be assessed to determine the overall risk level presented
by each hazard. This process begins before the flight using the process outlined in the previous chapter. While risk assessment
may seem subjective at first, pilots can learn effective risk-management through routine practice and application.
Risk Assessment Components
Risk is the composite of the likelihood (probability) and the severity (consequences) of a particular outcome. Both likelihood
and severity can vary in magnitude.
Risk Likelihood
The following terms describe the likelihood of an outcome:
• Probable–An event may occur several times.
• Occasional–An event may occur sometime.
• Remote–An event is unlikely to occur but is possible.
• Improbable–An event is highly unlikely to occur.
To illustrate, consider the likelihood of exceeding airframe structural limits if penetrating a thunderstorm. It is likely that the
airframe’s structural limits would be exceeded each time this occurs, making the likelihood “probable.”
As another example, consider a case where a pilot operates at an airport surrounded by rough terrain. The runways are just long
enough to accommodate the aircraft. The possibility exists for a runway overrun on each landing. Given this data, an overrun
could occur sometime, and the likelihood is “occasional.”
Risk Severity
The following terms describe the severity of an outcome.
• Catastrophic–Results in fatalities and/or total airframe loss.
• Critical–Severe injury or major airframe or property damage.
• Marginal–Minor injury or minor airframe or property damage.
• Negligible–Less than minor injury or damage.
To illustrate, consider the example of penetrating a thunderstorm. A loss of control event exceeding airframe structural limits
could result in either severe injuries or fatalities and airframe loss, creating either a “critical” or a “catastrophic” outcome.
In the example of the marginal runway length, an overrun could cause major damage to the aircraft and possible severe injuries,
or a “critical” outcome.
Chapter 4: Assessing Risk
Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
Using a Risk Assessment Matrix
Once risk likelihood and severity have been determined, the pilot may use a tabular matrix to find the composite of these two
parameters. [Figure 4-1]
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible
Improbable
Remote
Occasional
Probable
Risk Assessment Matrix
Likelihood
Severity
Serious LowMedium
Serious
SeriousHigh High
High
Figure 4-1. Risk Assessment Matrix.
Cross-matching the likelihood and severity on the matrix determines the composite risk. A thunderstorm penetration, with
“catastrophic” severity and either “probable” or “occasional” likelihood, constitutes a high (red) risk level. The runway overrun,
with “critical” severity and “occasional” likelihood, constitutes a serious (yellow) risk level.
The medium (green) risk level implies a “go” decision for a planned or ongoing flight. However, in this case, risk should still
be mitigated if possible.
The high (red) or serious (yellow) categories imply “no-go” unless the pilot finds a means to reduce the risk, such that the next
iteration of risk assessment indicates a medium or low risk.
Risk analysis should begin hours, days, or even weeks before a flight. For a simple flight, hours in advance may suffice.
However, for a complex flight with multiple legs or a series of flights over several days, a pilot should begin to consider hazards
and associated risks over an extended time period.
Matrix Errors
When assigning a risk level to a hazard using a matrix, the results could be subject to certain errors.
Accuracy
The matrix provides discrete results that depend on the accurate assignment of likelihood and severity. While conducting a
risk assessment, a pilot may be unsure of the likelihood or severity for a particular risk or find it difficult to choose between
adjacent parameters. In such cases, pilots should apply the more conservative parameter(s), which place the risk at a higher
level. Pilots learning risk analysis should seek the opinion of a more experienced pilot or an instructor if there is any doubt as
to the accuracy of inputs.
Skewing
Pilots sometimes use inputs that skew the risk toward a lower level due to the desire to complete a flight.
Obsolescence
The matrix results lose relevance if the hazards change before a flight departs. Pilots should verify and reevaluate their risk
assessment based on current information and conditions before flight.
Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
Case Study
Note: Refer to the case study section of Chapter 3 if needed.
Risk Assessment Analysis
The pilot, Tricia, identified nine separate hazards and associated risks that will affect a direct non-stop flight from Animas Air
Park (00C) in Colorado to the Santa Rosa, California airport (KSTS). Now, she begins the process of assessing these risks using
PA VE checklist elements.
Pilot
Tricia identified both capability and aeromedical risks. She concludes that reduced IFR proficiency means that a loss of control
in-flight (LOC-I) event is possible although unlikely. A LOC-I event, especially in convection or icing conditions, could result
in a fatal accident. A combination of “remote” likelihood and “catastrophic” severity indicates a serious (yellow) risk on the
risk assessment matrix.
She also self-assessed her aeromedical risks using the IMSAFE checklist and identified alcohol and fatigue as potential hazards.
The risks associated with these hazards could lead to multiple in-flight errors that could result in major damage or injury.
Collectively, she assesses these risks as having “occasional” likelihood and “critical” severity. On the risk assessment matrix,
this combination indicates a serious (yellow) risk. [Figure 4-2]
Flight Risk Assessment Tool
PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results
Pilot “P”
Capability
Aeromedical
Not IFR proficient
Alcohol and lack of sleep
LOC
Fatigue related errors
remote
occasional
catastrophic
critical serious
serious
Figure 4-2. FRAT excerpt for pilot hazards and associated risks.
Aircraft
She identified three areas that pertain to aircraft-related risk. During a non-stop flight, the likelihood of fuel exhaustion increases
if extensive deviation around weather is needed. Fuel exhaustion over rugged western terrain could result in a fatal accident.
Her assessment results in a “remote” likelihood with “catastrophic” consequences, which indicate a serious (yellow) risk on
the risk assessment matrix.
Tricia also noted that her aircraft is not approved for flight in known icing conditions and that a flight along the planned route
might encounter icing conditions at some point. Even with an “occasional” likelihood, this could generate a CFIT or LOC-I
event with fatalities, or “catastrophic” consequences, thus indicating a high (red) risk on the risk assessment matrix.
Finally, the aircraft may lack the performance needed to depart from the 5,000-foot runway at Animas Air Park. Having the
Smiths on board, everyone’s baggage, and a reduced fuel load would result in a takeoff at the aircraft's maximum gross weight
of 2,740 pounds. The calculated takeoff distance would be 4,700 feet, and using her 20 percent safety factor produces a desired
runway length of 5,640 feet, which exceeds the available runway distance. Under these conditions, Tricia determines that an
overrun is possible at least some of the time and could cause major damage or severe injuries. This “occasional” likelihood and
“critical” severity produces a serious (yellow) risk level from the risk assessment matrix. [Figure 4-3]
Flight Risk Assessment Tool
PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results
Aircraft “A”
Fuel/Range/Payload
Equipment
Cannot carry full fuel
Not certified for known ice
Fuel exhaustion
LOC
remote
occasional
catastrophic
catastrophic
Performance Marginal takeoff performance Overrun, LOC, or CFIT occasional critical
high
serious
serious
Figure 4-3. FRAT excerpt for aircraft hazards and associated risks.
Environment
She identified three areas with environment-related risk. The weather hazards on the direct route to Santa Rosa include
thunderstorms, icing, and low ceilings. There could be severe turbulence in the convective activity, which covers most of the
route and poses at least an upset potential at some time, producing an “occasional” likelihood. An upset in severe turbulence
Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
could result in a LOC-I event and “catastrophic” fatal accident. The “occasional” likelihood and “catastrophic” severity indicate
a high (red) risk on the risk assessment matrix.
Tricia’s original proposed route traverses some very high and rugged terrain. If she were to attempt to fly under the low ceilings
and weather, the terrain would be a hazard with an associated CFIT risk. A CFIT event, while unlikely for a pilot with her
experience, would still be possible and could result in fatalities. This “remote” likelihood and “catastrophic” severity indicate
a serious (yellow) risk on the risk assessment matrix.
The Animas Air Park elevation of 6,684 feet combined with July temperatures result in a high density altitude, which constitutes
a hazard. The combination of high density altitude and high terrain in the area could lead to a “catastrophic” CFIT accident. This
could occur at least sometime or with “occasional” likelihood. The combination of “occasional” likelihood and “catastrophic”
severity indicate a high (red) risk on the risk assessment matrix.
Flight Risk Assessment Tool
PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results
Environment “V”
high
high
highWeather
Terrain
Thunderstorms, icing, low ceilings
High terrain
LOC and CFIT
CFIT
occasional
occasional
catastrophic
catastrophic
Airspace, ATC, Airports
Night/Over Water
High density altitude
N/A
CFIT
N/A
occasional catastrophic
Figure 4-4. FRAT excerpt for environment hazards and associated risks.
Both Tricia and Martha face pop-up business events that appear to be critical, and Tricia has agreed to provide a solution to
their transportation requirement.
Tricia feels the pressure to get to Santa Rosa before the Tuesday meeting. The Smiths are good friends, and she does not want to
disappoint them. She feels additional pressure because the Smiths are expected to officiate at the Independence Day festivities
and wish to attend parties that night. They may not be aware of any reason why Tricia could not depart early on Tuesday and
get to Santa Rosa in time for their meetings using a single-engine GA airplane.
She concludes that external pressures are magnifying the identified risks, indicating a “probable” likelihood and “catastrophic”
severity with high (red) risk levels.
Flight Risk Assessment Tool
PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results
External Pressure “E”
Personal
Business
N/A
Meeting deadlines for myself and Ms. Smith
N/A
Increased risk in all other categories probable catastrophic high
Figure 4-5. FRAT Excerpt for external pressure hazards and associated risks.
She finishes recording her risk assessment analysis [Figure 4-6] and begins determining ways to mitigate the risks (see the case
study section in Chapter 5, Mitigating Risk). She will soon need to discuss the next steps with the Smiths.
Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
Flight Risk Assessment Tool
PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results
Pilot “P”
Aircraft “A”
Environment “V”
External Pressure “E”
Capability
Aeromedical
Not IFR proficient
Alcohol and lack of sleep
LOC
Fatigue related errors
remote
occasional
catastrophic
critical
Fuel/Range/Payload
Equipment
Cannot carry full fuel
Not certified for known ice
Fuel exhaustion
LOC
remote
occasional
catastrophic
catastrophic
Performance Marginal takeoff performance Overrun, LOC, or CFIT occasional critical
Personal
Business
N/A
Meeting deadlines for myself and Ms. Smith
N/A
Increased risk in all other categories probable catastrophic high
high
high
high
high
serious
serious
serious
serious
Weather
Terrain
Thunderstorms, icing, low ceilings
High terrain
LOC and CFIT
CFIT
occasional
occasional
catastrophic
catastrophic
Airspace, ATC, Airports
Night/Over Water
High density altitude
N/A
CFIT
N/A
occasional catastrophic
Figure 4-6. FRAT hazards and associated risks.
Chapter Summary
Risk assessment is a critical element in the risk analysis process. To determine overall risk levels, the pilot assesses both risk
likelihood and risk severity for all identified hazards. The primary tools for this process are the FRAT and the risk assessment
matrix. A pilot’s risk assessment accuracy should improve with practice.
Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
Introduction
Risk mitigation reduces the likelihood or predicted severity of potential effects of hazards. As discussed in Chapter 4, Assessing
Risk, high (red) and serious (yellow) risks should be mitigated. High risks the pilot cannot mitigate should lead to a no-go
decision. Departing with serious risks is also an abnormal situation that calls for additional mitigation. The risk mitigation
process may start days or weeks before a flight and depends on the complexity of the plan.
Air carrier, charter, and fractional operations conducted under 14 CFR parts 121, 135, and 91 Subpart K normally preclude
operations in the serious and high-risk categories. Corporate turbojet operators also typically adhere to this standard. In addition
to regulatory requirements, these operators utilize concepts, procedures, and tools such as safety management systems (SMS)
to ensure risks are identified, assessed, and managed appropriately. General aviation pilots can manage risk in a professional
manner as well. Risks should be managed such that they are mitigated to medium (green) levels or lower.
Risk mitigation may also allow a pilot to undertake or complete a flight that would otherwise be subject to unacceptable risks.
Conversely, the pilot should not depart if the same process reveals safe flight is not possible under the given conditions.
If having a doubt about risk mitigation, a pilot should consider the value of mitigation against the potential cost of property
damage and loss of life. A saying goes, safety costs a lot less than an accident. In fact, risk mitigation makes long-term economic
sense.
Preflight Risk Mitigation Strategies
Pilots choose from a variety of strategies to mitigate risks, and different strategies may apply to different hazards. Nevertheless,
there are a few general strategies that are effective for each area on the PA VE checklist. Pilot, aircraft, and external pressure
risks respond well to early, direct action. On the other hand, the scope of many environmental hazards often favors avoidance
as a mitigation strategy.
Mitigating Pilot Risks
Personal minimums that account for pilot experience and proficiency mitigate some risks. Pilots flying unfamiliar aircraft may
need to raise their personal minimums for that aircraft. When training, pilots can take advantage of scenarios that include risk
management in addition to pilot skill elements. Self-evaluation after a flight may alert a pilot of the need for additional training,
which may also decrease future risk. If there is any doubt concerning the outcome of a flight, the pilot should consider hiring
an instructor or a mentor pilot and making the trip a learning experience.
Use of and careful consideration of the IMSAFE checklist (illness, medication, stress, alcohol, fatigue, emotion) reduces
aeromedical risk.
Mitigating Aircraft Risks
Factoring performance data to create safety margins mitigates some risks. Using an aircraft with redundant systems or an
aircraft with automation that reduces pilot workload also lowers accident risk. Additionally, addressing discrepancies and
conducting proper maintenance can increase reliability and reduce risk. Thorough preflight and postflight inspections also
mitigate aircraft risks.
Carrying enough fuel with a sufficient reserve reduces the likelihood of a low-fuel emergency or a forced landing. On some
flights, planning for a fuel stop reduces that risk.
If the pilot has a choice, the selection of aircraft may reduce risk. The decision may consider the aircraft performance, the
number of engines, known icing capability, and avionics or automation available.
Chapter 5: Mitigating Risk