Introduction
The accident rate for helicopters has traditionally been higher
than the accident rate of fixed-wing aircraft, probably due to
the helicopter’s unique capabilities to fly and land in more
diverse situations than fixed-wing aircraft and pilot attempts
to fly the helicopter beyond the limits of his or her abilities or
beyond the capabilities of the helicopter. With no significant
improvement in helicopter accident rates for the last 20 years,
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has joined with
various members of the helicopter community to improve
the safety of helicopter operations.
According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
statistics, approximately 80 percent of all aviation accidents
are caused by pilot error, the human factor. Many of
these accidents are the result of the failure of instructors
to incorporate single-pilot resource management (SRM)
and risk management into flight training instruction of
aeronautical decision-making (ADM).
SRM is defined as the art of managing all the resources (both
on board the aircraft and from outside sources) available to a
pilot prior to and during flight to ensure a successful flight.
When properly applied, SRM is a key component of ADM.
Additional discussion includes integral topics such as, the
concepts of risk management, workload or task management,
situational awareness, controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)
awareness, and automation management.
Effective Aeronautical
Decision-Making
Chapter 13
Preflight
Takeoff
Cruise
Approach & Landing
Time
Task Load
High
Low
Pilot Capabilities
Task Requirements
Figure 13-1. The pilot has a limited capacity of doing work and handling tasks, meaning there is a point at which the tasking exceeds
the pilot’s capability. When this happens, either tasks are not done properly or some are not done at all.
ADM is all about learning how to gather information, analyze
it, and make decisions. It helps the pilot accurately assess
and manage risk and make accurate and timely decisions.
Although the flight is coordinated by a single person, the
use of available resources, such as air traffic control (ATC)
and flight service stations (FSS)/automated flight service
stations (AFSS), replicates the principles of crew resource
management (CRM) (see page 14-7).
References on SRM and ADM include:
• FAA-H-8083-2, Risk Management Handbook.
• Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM).
• Advisory Circular (AC) 60-22, Aeronautical Decision
Making, which provides background information
about ADM training in the general aviation (GA)
environment.
• FAA-H-8083-25, Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical
Knowledge.
Aeronautical Decision-Making (ADM)
Making good choices sounds easy enough. However,
there are a multitude of factors that come into play when
these choices, and subsequent decisions, are made in the
aeronautical world. Many tools are available for pilots to
become more self-aware and assess the options available,
along with the impact of their decision. Yet, with all the
available resources, accident rates are not being reduced. Poor
decisions continue to be made, frequently resulting in lives
being lost and/or aircraft damaged or destroyed. The Risk
Management Handbook discusses ADM and SRM in detail
and should be thoroughly read and understood.
While progress is continually being made in the advancement
of pilot training methods, aircraft equipment and systems, and
services for pilots, accidents still occur. Historically, the term
“pilot error” has been used to describe the causes of these
accidents. Pilot error means an action or decision made by
the pilot was the cause of, or a contributing factor that led to,
the accident. This definition also includes the pilot’s failure to
make a decision or take action. From a broader perspective,
the phrase “human factors related” more aptly describes these
accidents since it is usually not a single decision that leads
to an accident, but a chain of events triggered by a number
of factors. [Figure 13-1]
The poor judgment chain, sometimes referred to as the
“error chain,” is a term used to describe this concept of
contributing factors in a human factors related accident.
Breaking one link in the chain is often the only event
necessary to change the outcome of the sequence of
events. The following is an example of the type of scenario
illustrating the poor judgment chain.
Scenario
A Helicopter Air Ambulance (HAA) pilot is nearing the end
of his shift when he receives a request for a patient pickup
at a roadside vehicle accident. The pilot has started to feel
the onset of a cold; his thoughts are on getting home and
getting a good night’s sleep. After receiving the request, the
pilot checks the accident location and required flightpath
to determine if he has time to complete the flight to the
scene, then on to the hospital before his shift expires. The
pilot checks the weather and determines that, although
thunderstorms are approaching, the flight can be completed
prior to their arrival.
The pilot and on-board medical crews depart the home
location and arrive overhead, at the scene of the vehicular
accident. The pilot is not comfortable with the selected
landing area due to tall trees in all quadrants of the confined
area. The pilot searches for a secondary landing area. Unable
to find one nearby, the pilot then returns to the initial landing
area and decides he can make it work.
After successfully landing the aircraft, he is told that there
will be a delay before the patient is loaded because more time
is needed to extricate the patient from the wreckage. Knowing
his shift is nearly over, the pilot begins to feel pressured to
“hurry up” or he will require an extension for his duty day.
After 30 minutes, the patient is loaded, and the pilot ensures
everyone is secure. He notes that the storm is now nearby and
that winds have picked up considerably. The pilot thinks, “No
turning back now, the patient is on board and I’m running out
of time.” The pilot knows he must take off almost vertically
to clear the obstacles and chooses his departure path based
on the observed wind during landing. Moments later, prior to
clearing the obstacles, the aircraft begins an uncontrollable
spin and augers back to the ground, seriously injuring all on
board and destroying the aircraft.
What could the pilot have done differently to break this
error chain? More important—what would you have done
differently? By discussing the events that led to this accident,
you should develop an understanding of how a series of
judgmental errors contributed to the final outcome of this flight.
For example, the pilot’s decision to fly the aircraft knowing
that the effects of an illness were present was the initial
contributing factor. The pilot was aware of his illness, but,
was he aware of the impact of the symptoms—fatigue,
general uneasy feeling due to a slight fever, perhaps?
Next, knowing the shift was about to end, the pilot based his
time required to complete the flight on ideal conditions, and
did not take into consideration the possibility of delays. This
led to a feeling of being time limited.
Even after determining the landing area was unsuitable, the
pilot forced the landing due to time constraints. At any time
during this sequence, the pilot could have aborted the flight
rather than risk crew lives. Instead, the pilot became blinded
by a determination to continue.
After landing, and waiting 30 minutes longer than planned,
the pilot observed the outer effects of the thunderstorm, yet
still attempted to depart. The pilot dispelled any available
options by thinking the only option was to go forward;
however, it would have been safer to discontinue the flight.
Using the same departure path selected under different wind
conditions, the pilot took off and encountered winds that
led to loss of aircraft control. Once again faced with a self-
imposed time constraint, the pilot improperly chose to depart
the confined area. The end result: instead of one patient to
transport by ground (had the pilot aborted the flight at any
point), there were four patients to be transported.
On numerous occasions leading to and during the flight, the
pilot could have made effective decisions that could have
prevented this accident. However, as the chain of events
unfolded, each poor decision left him with fewer options.
Making sound decisions is the key to preventing accidents.
Traditional pilot training emphasizes flying skills, knowledge
of the aircraft, and familiarity with regulations. SRM and
ADM training focus on the decision-making process and on
the factors that affect a pilot’s ability to make effective choices.
Trescott Tips
Max Trescott, Master Certificated Flight Instructor (CFI)
and Master Ground Instructor and winner of the 2008 CFI of
the year, has published numerous safety tips that every pilot
should heed. He believes that the word “probably” should
be purged from our flying vocabulary. Mr. Trescott contends
that “probably” means we’ve done an informal assessment
of the likelihood of an event occurring and have assigned a
probability to it. He believes the term implies that we believe
things are likely to work out, but there’s some reasonable
doubt in our mind. He further explains that if you ever think
that your course of action will “probably work out,” you
need to choose a new option that you know will work out.
Another safety tip details the importance of accumulating
flight hours in one specific airframe type. He explains that
“statistics have shown that accidents are correlated more with
the number of hours of experience a pilot has in a particular
aircraft model and not with his or her total number of flight
hours. Accidents tend to decrease after a pilot accumulates
at least 100 hours of experience in the aircraft he or she is
flying. Thus, when learning to fly, or when transitioning into
a new model, your goal should be to concentrate your flying
hours in that model.” He suggests waiting until you reach 100
hours of experience in one particular model before attempting
a dual rating with another model. In addition, if you only fly
a few hours per year, maximize your safety by concentrating
those hours in just one aircraft model.
The third safety tip that is well worth mentioning is what
Mr. Trescott calls “building experience from the armchair.”
Armchair flying is simply closing your eyes and mentally
practicing exactly what you do in the aircraft. This is an
excellent way to practice making radio calls, departures,
approaches and even visualizing the parts and pieces of the
aircraft. This type of flying does not cost a dime and will
make you a better prepared and more proficient pilot.
All three of Max Trescott’s safety tips incorporate the ADM
process and emphasize the importance of how safety and
good decision-making is essential to aviation.
The Decision-Making Process
An understanding of the decision-making process provides
a pilot with a foundation for developing ADM skills. Some
situations, such as engine failures, require a pilot to respond
immediately using established procedures with little time
for detailed analysis. Called automatic decision-making,
it is based upon training, experience, and recognition.
Traditionally, pilots have been well trained to react to
emergencies, but are not as well prepared to make decisions
that require a more reflective response when greater analysis
is necessary. They often overlook the phase of decision-
making that is accomplished on the ground: the preflight,
flight planning, performance planning, weather briefing, and
weight/center of gravity configurations. Thorough and proper
completion of these tasks provides increased awareness and
a base of knowledge available to the pilot prior to departure
and once airborne. Typically during a flight, a pilot has time
to examine any changes that occur, gather information, and
assess risk before reaching a decision. The steps leading to
this conclusion constitute the decision-making process.
Defining the Problem
Defining the problem is the first step in the decision-making
process and begins with recognizing that a change has
occurred or that an expected change did not occur. A problem
is perceived first by the senses, then is distinguished through
insight (self-awareness) and experience. Insight, experience,
and objective analysis of all available information are used to
determine the exact nature and severity of the problem. One
critical error that can be made during the decision-making
process is incorrectly defining the problem.
While going through the following example, keep in mind what
errors lead up to the event. What planning could have been
completed prior to departing that may have led to avoiding
this situation? What instruction could the pilot have had
during training that may have better prepared the pilot for this
scenario? Could the pilot have assessed potential problems
based on what the aircraft “felt like” at a hover? All these
factors go into recognizing a change and the timely response.
While doing a hover check after picking up firefighters at
the bottom of a canyon, a pilot realized that she was only
20 pounds under maximum gross weight. What she failed
to realize was that the firefighters had stowed some of their
heaviest gear in the baggage compartment, which shifted
the center of gravity (CG) slightly behind the aft limits.
Since weight and balance had never created any problems
for her in the past, she did not bother to calculate CG and
power required. She did try to estimate it by remembering
the figures from earlier in the morning at the base camp.
At a 5,000-foot density altitude (DA) and maximum gross
weight, the performance charts indicated the helicopter
had plenty of excess power. Unfortunately, the temperature
was 93 °F and the pressure altitude at the pickup point was
6,200 feet (DA = 9,600 feet). Since there was enough power
for the hover check, the pilot decided there was sufficient
power to takeoff.
Even though the helicopter accelerated slowly during the
takeoff, the distance between the helicopter and the ground
continued to increase. However, when the pilot attempted to
establish the best rate of climb speed, the nose tended to pitch
up to a higher-than-normal attitude, and the pilot noticed that
the helicopter was not gaining enough altitude in relation to
the canyon wall approximately 200 yards ahead.
Choosing a Course of Action
After the problem has been identified, a pilot must evaluate
the need to react to it and determine the actions to take to
resolve the situation in the time available. The expected
outcome of each possible action should be considered and
the risks assessed before a pilot decides on a response to
the situation.
The pilot’s first thought was to pull up on the collective and
pull back on the cyclic. After weighing the consequences of
possibly losing rotor revolutions per minute (rpm) and not
being able to maintain the climb rate sufficiently to clear the
canyon wall, which was then only a hundred yards away, she
realized the only course was to try to turn back to the landing
zone on the canyon floor.
Implementing the Decision and Evaluating the
Outcome
Although a decision may be reached and a course of action
implemented, the decision-making process is not complete.
It is important to think ahead and determine how the
decision could affect other phases of the flight. As the flight
progresses, a pilot must continue to evaluate the outcome of
the decision to ensure that it is producing the desired result.
As the pilot made the turn to the downwind, the airspeed
dropped nearly to zero, and the helicopter became very
difficult to control. (At this point, the pilot must increase
airspeed in order to maintain translational lift.) Since the
CG was aft of limits, she needed to apply more forward
cyclic than usual. As she approached the landing zone
with a high rate of descent, she realized that she would
Situational Awareness
Situational awareness is the accurate perception and understanding of all the factors and conditions
within the four fundamental risk elements (pilot, aircraft, environment, external pressures).
Facilitate development of
ADM is a systematic approach to
the mental process of evaluating
a given set of circumstances and
determining the best course
of action.
Single-Pilot Resource Management
5P Model: Plan, Plane, Pilot, Passengers, Programming
Information
Management
Information management is the
process pilots use to gather
pertinent information from all
appropriate sources.
Automation
Management
Automation management is
the ability to control and
navigate an aircraft by
correctly managing its
automated systems.
Task
Management
Task management is the
process pilots use to manage
the many concurrent tasks
involved in safely flying
an aircraft.
Risk
Management
Risk management is a
decision-making process
designed to identify hazards
systematically, assess the
degree of risk, and determine
the best course of action.
Perceive, Process, Perform
to identify, evaluate, and
mitigate hazards related to
3P Model
Pilot
Aircraft
EnVironment
External Pressures
Incorporates the elements of
These elements combine to create and maintain
Higher-Order Thinking Skills (HOTS)
Aeronautical Decision-Making
Problem-Based Learning
Scenario-Based Training Learner-Centered Grading
Figure 13-2. Various models of decision-making are used in problem solving.
be in a potential vortex ring state situation if she tried to
trade airspeed for altitude and lost effective translational
lift (ETL). Therefore, it did not appear that she would be
able to terminate the approach in a hover. The pilot decided
to make the shallowest approach possible and perform a
run-on landing.
Pilots sometimes have trouble not because of deficient basic
skills or system knowledge, but because of faulty decision-
making skills. Although aeronautical decisions may appear
to be simple or routine, each individual decision in aviation
often defines the options available for the next decision the
pilot must make, and the options (good or bad) it provides.
Therefore, a poor decision early in a flight can compromise
the safety of the flight at a later time. It is important to make
appropriate and decisive choices because good decision-
making early in an emergency provide greater latitude for
later options.
Decision-Making Models
The decision-making process normally consists of several
steps before a pilot chooses a course of action. A variety
of structured frameworks for decision-making provide
assistance in organizing the decision process. These models
include but are not limited to the 5P (Plan, Plane, Pilot,
Passengers, Programming), the OODA Loop (Observation,
Orientation, Decision, Action), and the DECIDE (Detect,
Estimate, Choose, Identify, Do, and Evaluate) models.
[Figure 13-2] All these models and their variations are
discussed in detail in the Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical
Knowledge section covering aeronautical decision-making.
Whichever model is used, the pilot learns how to define
the problem, choose a course of action, implement the
decision, and evaluate the outcome. Remember, there is
no one right answer in this process: a pilot analyzes the
situation in light of experience level, personal minimums,
and current physical and mental readiness levels, and then
makes a decision.
Illness—Do I have any symptoms?
Medication—Have I been taking prescription or
over-the-counter drugs?
Stress—Am I under psychological pressure from
the job? Worried about financial matters, health
problems, or family discord?
Alcohol—Have I been drinking within 8 hours?
Within 24 hours?
Fatigue—Am I tired and not adequately rested?
Emotion—Am I angry, depressed, or anxious?
I’M SAFE CHECKLIST
Figure 13-3. I’M SAFE checklist.
Pilot Self-Assessment
The pilot in command (PIC) of an aircraft is directly
responsible for and is the final authority for the operation
of that aircraft. The list of PIC responsibilities is long,
and nothing should be overlooked. To exercise those
responsibilities effectively and make effective decisions
regarding the outcome of a flight, a pilot must have an
understanding of personal limitations. Pilot performance from
planning the flight to execution of the flight is affected by
many factors, such as health, experience, knowledge, skill
level, and attitude.
Exercising good judgment begins prior to taking the controls
of an aircraft. Often, pilots thoroughly check their aircraft
to determine airworthiness, yet do not evaluate their own
fitness for flight. Just as a checklist is used when preflighting
an aircraft, a personal checklist based on such factors as
experience, currency, and comfort level can help determine
if a pilot is prepared for a particular flight. Specifying when
refresher training should be accomplished and designating
weather minimums, which may be higher than those listed in
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 91,
are elements that may be included on a personal checklist. Over
confidence can kill just as fast as inexperience. In addition to a
review of personal limitations, a pilot should use the I’M SAFE
checklist to further evaluate fitness for flight. [Figure 13-3]
Curiosity: Healthy or Harmful?
The roots of aviation are firmly based on curiosity. Where
would we be today had it not been for the dreams of
Leonardo da Vinci, the Wright Brothers, and Igor Sikorsky?
They all were infatuated with flight, a curiosity that led to
the origins of aviation. The tale of aviation is full of firsts:
first flight, first helicopter, first trans-Atlantic flight, and so
on. But, along the way there were many setbacks, fatalities,
and lessons learned.
Today, we continue to learn and investigate the limits
of aviation. We’ve been to the moon, and soon beyond.
Our curiosity will continue to drive us to search for the
next challenge.
However, curiosity can also have catastrophic consequences.
Despite over 100 years of aviation practice, we still see
accidents that are caused by impaired judgment formed
from curious behavior. Pilots commonly seek to determine
the limits of their ability as well as the limits of the aircraft.
Unfortunately, too often this leads to mishaps with deadly
results. Inquisitive behavior must be harnessed and displayed
within personal and material limits.
Deadly curiosity may not seem as obvious to some as it is to
others. Simple thoughts such as, “Is visibility really as bad
as what the ATIS is reporting?” or “Will the 20-minute fuel
light really indicate only 20 minutes worth of fuel?” can lead
to poor decisions and disastrous outcomes.
Some aviators blatantly violate rules and aircraft limitations
without thinking through the consequences. “What
indications and change in flight characteristics will I see if
I fly this helicopter above its maximum gross weight?” or
“I’ve heard this helicopter can do aerobatic flight. Why is it
prohibited?” are examples of extremely harmful curiosity.
Even more astounding is their ignoring to the fact that the
damage potentially done to the aircraft will probably manifest
later in the aircraft’s life, affecting other crews. Spontaneous
excursions in aviation can be deadly.
Curiosity is natural and promotes learning. Airmen should
abide by established procedures until proper and complete
hazard assessment and risk management can be completed.
The PAVE Checklist
As found in the Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical
Knowledge, the FAA has designed a personal minimums
checklist. To help pilots with self-assessment, which in turn
helps mitigate risk, the acronym PAVE divides the risks of
flight into four categories. For each category, think of the
applicability specific to helicopter operations:
• Pilot (pilot in command)
- Physical, emotional readiness.
- Flight experience, recency, currency, total time
in type.
• Aircraft
- Is the helicopter capable of performing the task?
- Can it carry the necessary fuel?
- Does it provide adequate power margins for the
task to be accomplished?
- Can it carry the weight and remain within CG?
- Will there be external loads?
• Environment
- Helicopters are susceptible to the impact of
changing weather conditions.
- How will the change in moderating temperatures
and DA affect performance?
- Will controllability be jeopardized by winds,
terrain, and turbulence?
• External pressures
- Do not let the notion to accomplish “the mission”
override good judgment and safety.
- Many jobs include time lines. How often do we
hear “time is money” or “time is wasting”? Don’t
sacrifice safety for an implied or actual need to
meet the deadline!
- Do not allow yourself to feel pressured by
coworkers, family events, or friends.
Incorporated into preflight planning, the PAVE checklist
provides the pilot with a simple way to remember each
category to examine for risk prior to each flight. Once the
pilot identifies the risks of a flight, he or she needs to decide
whether the risk or combination of risks can be managed
safely and successfully. Remember, the PIC is responsible
for deciding about canceling the flight. If the pilot decides to
continue with the flight, he or she should develop strategies
to mitigate the risks.
One way to control risk is by setting personal minimums
for items in each risk category. Remember, these are limits
unique to an individual pilot’s current level of experience and
proficiency. They should be reevaluated periodically based
upon experience and proficiency.
Single-Pilot Resource Management
Many of the concepts utilized in CRM have been successfully
applied to single-pilot operations which led to the development
of SRM. Defined as the art and science of managing all the
resources (both on board the aircraft and from outside
resources) available to a single pilot (prior to and during
flight), SRM helps to ensure the successful outcome of the
flight. As mentioned earlier, this includes risk management,
situational awareness (SA), and CFIT awareness.
SRM training helps the pilot maintain SA by managing
automation, associated control, and navigation tasks. This
enables the pilot to accurately assess hazards, manage
resulting risk potential, and make good decisions.
To make informed decisions during flight operations, a pilot
must be aware of the resources found both inside and outside
the cockpit. Since useful tools and sources of information
may not always be readily apparent, learning to recognize
these resources is an essential part of SRM training. The pilot
must not only identify the available resources, but he or she
must also assess whether sufficient time is available to use
a particular one, and the impact its use will have upon the
safety of the flight.
If a pilot is flying alone into a confined area with no wind
sock or access to a current wind report, should that pilot pick
an approach path based on the direction of wind information
received from an earlier weather brief? Making an approach
into a confined area with a tailwind is a bad decision and can
be avoided. Prior to landing, the pilot should use outside
resources such a smoke, trees, and water on a pond to help
him or her accurately determine which direction the winds are
coming from. Pilots should never leave flying up to chance
and hope for the best. Many accidents could and should be
avoided by simply using the resources, internal and external
that are available.
Internal resources are found in the cockpit during flight. Since
some of the most valuable internal resources are ingenuity,
knowledge, and skill, a pilot can expand cockpit resources
immensely by improving these capabilities. This can be
accomplished by frequently reviewing flight information
publications, such as 14 CFR and the AIM, as well as by
pursuing additional training.
No other internal resource is more important than the pilot’s
own ability to control the situation, thereby controlling the
aircraft. Helicopter pilots quickly learn that it is not possible
to hover, single pilot, and pick up the checklist, a chart, or
publication without endangering themselves, the aircraft, or
those nearby.
Checklists are essential cockpit resources used to verify
the aircraft instruments and systems are checked, set, and
operating properly. They also ensure proper procedures
are performed if there is a system malfunction or inflight
emergency. Pilots at all levels of experience refer to
checklists. The more advanced the aircraft is, the more crucial
checklists are.
Therefore, have a plan on how to use the checklist (and other
necessary publications) before you begin the flight. Always
control the helicopter first. When hovering in an airport
environment, the pilot can always land the aircraft to access
ROBINSON R22
ROTORCRAFT
FLIGHT
MANUAL
Figure 13-4. Rotorcraft Flying Manual (RFM).
the checklist or a publication, or have a passenger assist with
holding items. There is nothing more unsettling than being in
flight and not having a well thought-out plan for managing
the necessary documents and data. This lack of planning
often leads to confusion, distractions and aircraft mishaps.
Another way to avoid a potentially complex and confusing
situation is to remove yourself from the situation. The
following is an example of how proper resource management
and removal from a situation are vital to safe flight.
A single pilot is conducting a helicopter cross-country flight.
He frequently goes to and is familiar with the final destination
airport. Weather is briefed to be well above the minimum
weather needed, but with isolated thunderstorms possible.
For the pilot, this is a routine run-of-the-mill flight. He has
done this many times before and has memorized the route,
checkpoints, frequencies, fuel required and knows exactly
what to expect.
However, once within 30 miles of the destination airport
the pilot observes that weather is deteriorating, and a
thunderstorm is nearby. The pilot assesses the situation and
determines the best course of action is to reroute to another
airport. The closest airport is an airport within Class C
airspace. At this point, the pilot realizes the publications with
the required alternate airport information are in the back of
the helicopter out of reach. Now what?
The pilot continues toward the alternate airport while
using the onboard equipment to access the information.
He struggles to obtain the information because he or she
is not thoroughly familiar with its operation. Finally, the
information is acquired and the pilot dials in the appropriate
alternate airfield information. Upon initial contact ARTCC
(Air Route Traffic Control Center) notifies the pilot that he
has entered the airspace without the required clearance; in
effect the pilot has violated airspace regulations.
Things have gone from bad to worse for him. When did the
trouble begin for this pilot and what options were available?
Without a doubt, problems began during the planning phase, as
the necessary resources were placed in the back of the aircraft,
unavailable to the pilot during flight. Additional training with
the available automated systems installed on the helicopter
would have expedited access to the necessary information.
What if they hadn’t been installed or were inoperative?
Next, a poor decision to continue towards the Class C airspace
was made. The pilot could have turned away from the Class
C airspace, removing himself from the situation until the
frequencies were entered and contact established. Remember,
when possible, choose an option that gives more time to
determine a course of action. Proper resource management
could have negated this airspace violation.
The example also demonstrates the need to have a thorough
understanding of all the equipment and systems in the
aircraft. As is often the case, the technology available today
is seldom used to its maximum capability. It is necessary to
become as familiar as possible with this equipment to utilize
all resources fully. For example, advanced navigation and
autopilot systems are valuable resources. However, if pilots
do not fully understand how to use this equipment, or they
rely on it so much they become complacent, the equipment
can become a detriment to safe flight.
Another internal resource is the Rotorcraft Flight Manual
(RFM). [Figure 13-4] The RFM:
• Must be on board the aircraft.
• Is indispensable for accurate flight planning.
• Plays a vital role in the resolution of inflight equipment
malfunctions.
Other valuable flight deck resources include current
aeronautical charts and publications, such as the Airport/
Facility Directory (A/FD).
As stated previously, passengers can also be a valuable
resource. Passengers can help watch for traffic and may be
able to provide information in an irregular situation, especially
if they are familiar with flying. Crew briefs to passengers
should always include some basic helicopter terminology. For
example, explain that in the event you ask them if you are clear
to hover to the right, their response should be either “yes, you
are clear to hover to the right” or “no you are not clear.” A
simple yes or no answer can be ambiguous. A strange smell
or sound may alert a passenger to a potential problem. As PIC,
a pilot should brief passengers before the flight to make sure
that they are comfortable voicing any concerns.