To maintain situational awareness, an accurate
perception must be attained of how the pilot, helicopter,
environment, and operation combine to affect the flight.
Situation
RISK ELEMENTSRISK ELEMENTS
EnvironmentAircraftPilot External Pressures
Factors such as weather and
airport conditions must be
examined.
The helicopter performance,
limitations, equipment, and
airworthiness must be deter-
mined.
The purpose of the flight is a
factor that influences the pilot’s
decision on undertaking or
continuing the flight.
The pilot’s fitness to fly must
be evaluated, including com-
petency in the helicopter,
currency, and flight experience.
Figure 13-5. Risk elements to evaluate in decision-making.
Instruction that integrates Single-Pilot Resource Management
into flight training teaches aspiring pilots how to be more
aware of potential risks in flying, how to identify those
risks clearly, and how to manage them successfully. The
importance of integrating available resources and learning
effective SRM skills cannot be overemphasized. Ignoring
safety issues can have fatal results.
Risk Management
Risk management is a formalized way of dealing with
hazards. It is the logical process of weighing the potential
cost of risks from hazards against the possible benefits of
allowing those risks from hazards to stand unmitigated. It
is a decision-making process designed to identify hazards
systematically, assess the degree of risk, and determine the
best course of action. Once risks are identified, they must be
assessed. The risk assessment determines the degree of risk
(negligible, low, medium, or high) and whether the degree
of risk is worth the outcome of the planned activity. If the
degree of risk is “acceptable,” the planned activity may
then be undertaken. Once the planned activity is started,
consideration must then be given whether to continue. Pilots
must have preplanned, viable alternatives available in the
event the original flight cannot be accomplished as planned.
Two defining elements of risk management are hazard and risk.
• A hazard is a present condition, event, object, or
circumstance that could lead to or contribute to an
unplanned or undesired event, such as an accident.
It is a source of danger. For example, binding in the
antitorque pedals represents a hazard.
• Risk is the future impact of a hazard that is not
controlled or eliminated. It is the possibility of loss
or injury. The level of risk is measured by the number
of people or resources affected (exposure), the extent
of possible loss (severity), and the likelihood of
loss (probability).
A hazard can be a real or perceived condition, event, or
circumstance that a pilot encounters. Learning how to identify
hazards, assess the degree of risk they pose, and determine the
best course of action is an important element of a safe flight.
Four Risk Elements
During each flight, decisions must be made regarding events
that involve interactions between the four risk elements—the
PIC, the aircraft, the environment, and the operation. The
decision-making process involves an evaluation of each of
these risk elements to achieve an accurate perception of the
flight situation. [Figure 13-5]
One of the most important decisions that a PIC must make is
the go/no-go decision. Evaluating each of these risk elements
can help a pilot decide whether a flight should be conducted
or continued. In the following situations, the four risk
elements and how they affect decision-making are evaluated.
Pilot—A pilot must continually make decisions about
personal competency, condition of health, mental and
emotional state, level of fatigue, and many other variables.
A situation to consider: a pilot is called early in the morning
to make a long flight. With only a few hours of sleep and
congestion that indicates the possible onset of a cold, is
that pilot safe to fly?
Aircraft—A pilot frequently bases decisions to fly on
personal evaluations of the aircraft, such as its powerplant,
performance, equipment, fuel state, or airworthiness. A
situation to consider: en route to an oil rig an hour’s flight
from shore, having just passed the shoreline, the pilot notices
the oil temperature at the high end of the caution range.
Should the pilot continue out to sea or return to the nearest
suitable heliport/airport?
Environment—This encompasses many elements unrelated
to the pilot or aircraft. It can include such factors as weather,
ATC, navigational aids (NAVAID), terrain, takeoff and
landing areas, and surrounding obstacles. Weather is one
element that can change drastically over time and distance.
A situation to consider: a pilot is ferrying a helicopter cross-
country and encounters unexpected low clouds and rain in an
area of rising terrain. Does the pilot try to stay under them
and scud run, or turn around, stay in the clear, and obtain
current weather information?
External Pressures—The interaction between the pilot,
the aircraft, and the environment is greatly influenced by
the purpose of each flight operation. A pilot must evaluate
the three previous areas to decide on the desirability of
undertaking or continuing the flight as planned. It is worth
asking why the flight is being made, how critical it is to
maintain the schedule, and if the trip is worth the risks. A
situation to consider: a pilot is tasked to take some technicians
into rugged mountains for a routine survey in marginal
weather. Would it be preferable to wait for better conditions
to ensure a safe flight? How would the priorities change if a
pilot were tasked to search for cross-country skiers who had
become lost in deep snow and radioed for help?
Assessing Risk
It is important for a pilot to learn how to assess risk. Before a
pilot can begin to assess risk, he or she must first perceive the
hazard and attendant risk(s). In aviation, experience, training,
and education help a pilot learn how to spot hazards quickly
and accurately. During flight training, the instructor should
point out the hazards and attendant risks to help the student
pilot learn to recognize them.
Once a hazard is identified, determining the probability
and severity of an accident (level of risk associated with it)
becomes the next step. For example, the hazard of binding
in the antitorque pedals poses a risk only if the helicopter is
flown. If the binding leads to a loss of directional control,
the risk is high that it could cause catastrophic damage
to the helicopter and the passengers. The pilot learns to
identify hazards and how to deal with them when they are
incorporated into the training program.
Every flight has hazards and some level of risk associated
with it. It is critical that pilots be able to:
• Differentiate, in advance, between a low-risk flight
and a high-risk flight.
• Establish a review process and develop risk mitigation
strategies to address flights throughout that range.
Examining NTSB reports and other accident research can
help a pilot to assess risk more effectively. For example,
the accident rate decreases by nearly 50 percent once a
pilot obtains 100 hours and continues to decrease until the
1,000-hour level. The data suggest that for the first 500
hours, pilots flying visual flight rules (VFR) at night should
establish higher personal limitations than are required by the
regulations and, if applicable, apply instrument flying skills
in this environment.
Individuals training to be helicopter pilots should remember
that the helicopter accident rate is 30 percent higher than the
accident rate for fixed-wing aircraft. While many factors
contribute to this, students must recognize the small margin
of error that exists for helicopter pilots in making critical
decisions. In helicopters, certain emergency actions require
immediate action by the pilot. In the event of an engine
malfunction, failure to immediately lower the collective
results in rotor decay and failed autorotation. Fixed wing
pilots may have slightly more time to react and establish
a controllable descent. According to the General Aviation
(GA) Joint Steering Committee, the leading causes of
accidents in GA are CFIT (see p.14-15), weather, runway
incursions, pilot decision-making, and loss of control.
These causes are referred to as pilot-error, or human factors
related, accidents. CFIT, runway incursions, and loss of
control type accidents typically occur when the pilot makes
a series of bad judgments, which leads to these events. For
example, when the pilot has not adequately planned the
flight and the pilot subsequently fails to maintain adequate
situational awareness to avoid the terrain, a CFIT accident
occurs.
While the reasons for individual helicopter incidents vary,
it can be argued that it is the helicopter’s flight mode and
operational complexity that directly contributes to each
incident. By nature of its purpose, a helicopter usually
flies closer to terrain than does a fixed-wing aircraft.
Subsequently, minimal time exists to avoid CFIT, weather
related, or loss of control type incidents that require quick
and accurate assessments. Fixed-wing aircraft normally fly
at higher altitudes and are flown from prepared surface to
prepared surface. Helicopters are often operated in smaller,
confined area-type environments and require continuous
pilot control. Helicopter pilots must be aware of what rotor
wash can do when landing to a dusty area or prior to starting
where loose debris may come in contact with the rotor blades.
Aeronautical
Decision-
Making
(Perceive)
(Perform) (Process)
Figure 13-6. 3P Model.
Often, the loss of control occurs when the pilot exceeds
design or established operating standards, and the resulting
situation exceeds pilot capability to handle it successfully.
The FAA generally characterizes these occurrences as
resulting from poor judgment. Likewise, most weather-
related accidents are not a result of the weather per se, but
of a failure of the pilot to avoid a weather phenomenon for
which the aircraft is not equipped, or the pilot is not trained
to handle. That is, the pilot decides to fly or to continues
into conditions beyond pilot capability, an action commonly
considered to be demonstrating bad judgment.
It cannot be emphasized enough that the helicopter’s unique
capabilities come with increased risk. Since most helicopter
operations are conducted by a single pilot, the workload is
increased greatly. Low-level maneuvering flight (a catch-
all category for different types of flying close to terrain or
obstacles, such as power line patrol, wildlife control, crop
dusting, air taxiing, and maneuvering for landing after an
instrument approach), is one of the largest single categories
of fatal accidents.
Fatal accidents that occur during approach often happen at
night or in instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions. Takeoff/
initial climb accidents are frequently due to the pilot’s lack
of awareness of the effects of density altitude on aircraft
performance or other improper takeoff planning that results
in loss of control during or shortly after takeoff. One of the
most lethal types of GA flying is attempting VFR flight into
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Accidents
involving poor weather decision-making account for about
4 percent of the total accidents but 14 percent of the fatal
mishaps. While weather forecast information has been
gradually improving, weather should remain a high priority
for every pilot assessing risk.
Using the 3P Model to Form Good Safety Habits
As discussed in the Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical
Knowledge, the Perceive, Process, Perform (3P) model helps
a pilot assess and manage risk effectively in the real world.
[Figure 13-6]
To use this model, the pilot will:
• Perceive hazards
• Process level of risk
• Perform risk management
Let’s put this to use through a common scenario, involving a
common task, such as a confined area approach. As is often
the case, the continuous loop consists of several elements;
each element must be addressed through the 3P process.
A utility helicopter pilot receives the task of flying four
passengers into a remote area for a hunting expedition. The
passengers have picked the location where they would like
to be dropped off based on the likelihood of wildlife being
in the area. The area has steep, rugged terrain in a series of
valleys and canyons leading up to large mountains.
Upon arrival at the location, the pilot locates a somewhat
large confined area near the base of one of the mountains.
The pilot begins the 3P process by quickly noting (or
perceiving) the hazards that affect the approach, landing,
and takeoff. Through thorough assessment the pilot takes
into consideration:
• Current aircraft weight/power available,
• Required approach angle to clear the trees for landing
in the confined area,
• Wind direction and velocity,
• Limited approach and departure paths (due to
constricting terrain),
• Escape routes should the approach need to be
terminated prior to landing,
• Possible hazards, such as wires or structures either
around the landing site or inside of the confined area,
and
• The condition of the terrain at the landing site. Mud,
dust, and snow can be extreme hazards if the pilot is not
properly trained to land in those particular conditions.
The pilot reviews the 3P process for each hazard. The pilot
has perceived the risk associated for each of the bullets listed
above. Now, the pilot assesses the risk level of each and what
to do to manage or mitigate the risk.
The aircraft weight/power risk is assessed as low. While
performing power checks, the pilot verified adequate out of
ground effect (OGE) power exists. The pilot is also aware
that, in this scenario, the departure DA (6,500 feet) is greater
than the arrival location DA (6,000 feet) and that several
hundred pounds of fuel have been burned off en route.
Furthermore, once the passengers have disembarked, more
power will be available for departure.
The pilot estimates that the highest obstacles along the
approach path are 70–80 feet in height. With the size of the
confined area, a normal approach angle can be maintained
to clear these obstacles, giving this a low risk level. To further
mitigate this risk the pilot has selected mental checkpoints
along the approach path that will serve as go/no-go points
should the pilot feel any assessed parameter is being exceeded.
Wind direction and velocity are assessed as a medium risk
because (for this scenario) the direction of the wind is slightly
offset from the chosen approach path, creating a 15–20°
crosswind with a steady 10-knot wind. The pilot also takes
into consideration that, due to the terrain, the wind direction
and velocity may change during the approach. The pilot’s
experience and awareness of the complexity of mountain flow
wind provide a management tool for risk reduction.
From an approach and departure standpoint, the risk is
assessed to be medium. There is only one viable approach
and departure path. Given the size of the confined area
and the wind direction, the approach and departure path is
deemed acceptable.
The pilot assigns a medium risk level to the selection of an
escape route. The pilot is aware of the constricting terrain on
either side. Although adequate area exists for maneuvering,
the pilot realizes there are physical boundaries and that
they can affect the options available should the pilot need to
conduct a go-around or abort the approach. Again, the pilot
uses mental checkpoints to ensure an early decision is made
to conduct a go-around, if needed. The selected go-around
or escape route will be in line with the selected approach/
departure path and generally into the wind.
As you may have noticed, one identified hazard and its
correlating risk management action may have subsequent
impact on other factors. This demonstrates the need for
continuous assessment and evaluation of the impact of chosen
courses of action.
The 3P model offers three good reasons for its use. First, it
is fairly simple to remember. Second, it offers a structured,
efficient, and systematic way to identify hazards, assess risk,
and implement effective risk controls. Third, practicing risk
management needs to be as automatic as basic aircraft control.
As is true for other flying skills, risk management thinking
habits are best developed through repetition and consistent
adherence to specific procedures.
Once the pilot completes the 3P decision process and selects
a course of action, the process begins anew as the set of
circumstances brought about by the selected course of action
requires new analysis. Thus, the decision-making process is
a continuous loop of perceiving, processing, and performing.
Workload or Task Management
One component of SRM is workload or task management.
Research shows that humans have a limited capacity for
information. Once information flow exceeds the person’s
ability to mentally process the information, any additional
information becomes unattended or displaces other tasks
and information already being processed. Once this situation
occurs, only two alternatives exist: shed the unimportant
tasks or perform all tasks at a less than optimal level. Like
an overloaded electrical circuit, either the consumption must
be reduced or a circuit failure is experienced.
Effective workload management ensures essential operations
are accomplished by planning and then placing them in
a sequence that avoids work overload. As a pilot gains
experience, he or she learns to recognize future workload
requirements and can prepare for high workload periods
during times of low workload.
Reviewing the appropriate chart and setting radio frequencies
well in advance of need help reduce workload as a flight
nears the airport. In addition, a pilot should listen to
Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS), Automated
Surface Observing System (ASOS), or Automated Weather
Observing System (AWOS), if available, and then monitor
the tower frequency or Common Traffic Advisory Frequency
(CTAF) to get a good idea of what traffic conditions to
expect. Checklists should be performed well in advance so
there is time to focus on traffic and ATC instructions. These
procedures are especially important prior to entering a high-
density traffic area, such as Class B airspace.
To manage workload, items should be prioritized. For
example, during any situation, and especially in an
emergency, a pilot should remember the phrase “aviate,
navigate, and communicate.” This means that the first
thing a pilot should do is make sure the helicopter is under
control, then begin flying to an acceptable landing area.
Only after the first two items are assured should a pilot try
to communicate with anyone.
Another important part of managing workload is recognizing
a work overload situation. The first effect of high workload
is that a pilot begins to work faster. As workload increases,
attention cannot be devoted to several tasks at one time, and
a pilot may begin to focus on one item. When a pilot becomes
task saturated, there is no awareness of additional inputs from
various sources, so decisions may be made on incomplete
information, and the possibility of error increases.
A very good example of this is inadvertent IMC. Once entering
into bad weather, work overload can occur immediately.
Mentally, the pilot must transition from flying outside of the
aircraft to flying inside the aircraft. Losing all visual references
can cause sensory overload and the ability to think rationally
can be lost. Instead of trusting the aircraft’s instruments, pilots
may try to hang onto the few visual references that they have,
and forget all about all other factors surrounding them. Instead
of slowing the helicopter down they increase airspeed. This
can be caused by an oculogravic illusion. This type of illusion
occurs when an aircraft accelerates and decelerates. Inertia
from linear accelerations and decelerations cause the otolith
organ to sense a nose-high or nose-low attitude. Pilots falsely
perceive that the aircraft is in a nose-high attitude. Therefore,
pilots increase airspeed. Pilots can also be looking down for
visual references and forget about the hazards in front of
them. Finally, since the pilots are not looking at the flight
instruments, the aircraft is not level. All of this can be avoided
by proper training and proper planning. If going inadvertent
IMC is your only course of action, pilots must commit to it
and fly the helicopter using only the flight instruments and not
trying to follow the few visual references they have.
When a work overload situation exists, a pilot needs to:
• Stop,
• Think,
• Slow down, and then
• Prioritize.
It is important for a pilot to understand how to decrease
workload by:
• Placing a situation in the proper perspective,
• Remaining calm, and
• Thinking rationally.
These key elements reduce stress and increase the pilot’s
ability to fly safely. They depend upon the experience,
discipline, and training that each safe flight earns. It is
important to understand options available to decrease
workload. For example, setting a radio frequency may be
delegated to another pilot or to a passenger, freeing the pilot
to perform higher-priority tasks.
Situational Awareness
In addition to learning to make good aeronautical decisions,
and learning to manage risk and flight workload, SA is an
important element of ADM. SA is the accurate perception
and understanding of all the factors and conditions within
the four fundamental risk elements (PAVE) that affect safety
before, during, and after the flight. SA involves being aware
of what is happening around you, in order to understand how
information, events, and your own actions will impact your
goals and objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking
SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of
the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error.
SA in a helicopter can be quickly lost. Understanding the
significance and impact of each risk factor independently
and cumulatively aid in safe flight operations. It is possible,
and all too likely, that we forget flying while at work. Our
occupation, or work, may be conducting long line operations,
maneuvering around city obstacles to allow a film crew
access to news events, spraying crops, ferrying passengers
or picking up a patient to be flown to a hospital. In each case
we are flying a helicopter. The moment we fail to account for
the aircraft systems, the environment, other aircraft, hazards,
and ourselves, we lose SA.
To maintain SA, all of the skills involved in SRM are
used. For example, an accurate perception of pilot fitness
can be achieved through self-assessment and recognition
of hazardous attitudes. A clear assessment of the status of
navigation equipment can be obtained through workload
management, while establishing a productive relationship
with ATC can be accomplished by effective resource use.
Obstacles to Maintaining Situational Awareness
What distractions interfere with our focus or train of thought?
There are many. A few examples pertinent to aviation, and
helicopters specifically, follow.
Fatigue, frequently associated with pilot error, is a threat to
aviation safety because it impairs alertness and performance.
[Figure 13-7] The term is used to describe a range of
experiences from sleepy or tired to exhausted. Two major
physiological phenomena create fatigue: circadian rhythm
disruption and sleep loss.
Many helicopter jobs require scheduling flexibility,
frequently affecting the body’s circadian rhythm. You
Warning Signs of Fatigue
zz
Vision going in and out of focus
Head bobbing involuntarily
Persistent yawning
Spotty short-term memory
Wandering or poorly organized thoughts
Missed or erroneous performance of routine procedures
Degradation of control accuracy
Long naps (3–4 hours*) can restore alertness
for 12–15 hours.
Short power naps (10–30 minutes*)
can restore alertness for 3–4 hours.
Eat high-protein meals.
Drink plenty of fluids, especially water.
Rotate flight tasks and converse with other
crew members or passengers.
Keep the flight deck temperature cool.
Move/stretch in the seat, and periodically
get up to walk around the aircraft, if possible.
* Allow 15–20 minutes after awakening to become fully
alert before assuming aircrew duties.
Countermeasures
Figure 13-7. Warning signs of fatigue according to the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI).
Figure 13-8. Countermeasures to fatigue according to the FAA
Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI).
Since complacency seems to creep into our routine without
notice, ask what has changed. The minor changes that go
unnoticed can be associated with the four fundamental risks
we previously discussed: pilot, aircraft, environment, and
external pressures.
As a pilot, am I still using checklists or have I become reliant
on memory to complete my checks? Do I check (Notices to
Airmen) NOTAMs before every flight or only when I think
it is necessary? And the aircraft: did I feel that vibration
before or is it new? Was there a log book entry for it? If so,
may be flying a day flight Monday and then at night on
Tuesday. Your awareness of how your body and mind
react to this variation in schedule is vital to safety. This
disruptive pattern may result in degradation of attention
and concentration, impaired coordination, and decreased
ability to communicate.
Physical fatigue results from sleep loss, exercise, or physical
work. Factors such as stress and prolonged performance of
cognitive work result in mental fatigue. Consecutive days of
flying the maximum allowable flight time can fatigue a pilot,
mentally and physically. It is important to take breaks within
the workday, as well as days off when possible. When you find
yourself in this situation, take an objective, honest assessment
of your state of mind. If necessary, use rest periods to allow
rejuvenation of the mind and body. [Figure 13-8]
Fatigue also occurs under circumstances in which there is
anticipation of flight followed by inactivity. For instance,
a pilot is given a task requiring a specific takeoff time. In
anticipation of the flight, the pilot’s adrenaline kicks in and
SA is elevated. After a delay (weather, maintenance, or any
other unforeseen delay), the pilot feels a letdown, in effect,
becoming fatigued. Then, upon resuming the flight, the pilot
does not have that same level of attention.
Complacency presents another obstacle to maintaining
SA. Defined as overconfidence from repeated experience
with a specific activity, complacency has been implicated
as a contributing factor in numerous aviation accidents
and incidents. When activities become routine, a pilot may
have a tendency to relax and not put as much effort into
performance. Like fatigue, complacency reduces a pilot’s
effectiveness on the flight deck. However, complacency is
more difficult to recognize than fatigue, since everything
seems to be progressing smoothly.
has it been checked?
Complacent acceptance of common weather patterns can
have huge impacts on safety. The forecast was for clearing
after the rain shower, but what was the dew-point spread?
The winds are greater than forecast. Will this create reduced
visibility in dusty, snowy areas or exceed wind limitations?
While conducting crop spraying, a new agent is used.
Does that change the weight? Does that change the flight
profile and, if so, what new hazards might be encountered?
When things are going smoothly, it is time to heighten your
awareness and become more attentive to your flight activities.
Advanced avionics have created a high degree of redundancy
and dependability in modern aircraft systems, which can
promote complacency and inattention. Routine flight
operations may lead to a sense of complacency, which can
threaten flight safety by reducing SA.
Loss of SA can be caused by a minor distraction that diverts
the pilot’s attention from monitoring the instruments or
scanning outside the aircraft. For example, a gauge that is
not reading correctly is a minor problem, but it can cause an
accident if the pilot diverts attention to the perceived problem
and neglects to control the aircraft properly.
Operational Pitfalls
There are numerous common behavioral traps that can
ensnare the unwary pilot. Pilots, particularly those with
considerable experience, try to complete a flight as planned,
please passengers, and meet schedules. This basic drive to
achieve can have an adverse effect on safety and can impose
an unrealistic assessment of piloting skills under stressful
conditions. These tendencies ultimately may bring about
practices that are dangerous and sometimes illegal and may
lead to a mishap. Pilots develop awareness and learn to avoid
many of these operational pitfalls through effective SRM
training. [Figure 13-9]
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)
Awareness
An emergency medical services (EMS) helicopter departed
for a night flight to transport an 11-day-old infant patient
from one hospital to another. No record was found indicating
the pilot obtained a weather briefing before departure. The
pilot had a choice of taking either a direct route that crossed
a remote area of rugged mountainous terrain with maximum
ground elevations of about 9,000 feet or a route that was
about 10 minutes longer and followed an interstate highway
with maximum ground elevations of about 6,000 feet. Radar
data, which show about 4 minutes of the helicopter’s flight
before coverage was lost due to mountainous terrain, are
consistent with the flight following the direct route.
A search was initiated about 4 hours after the helicopter did
not arrive at the destination hospital, and the wreckage was
located the following morning. Physical evidence observed
at the accident site indicated that the helicopter was in level
flight at impact and was consistent with CFIT. [Figure 13-10]
CFIT is a type of accident that continues to be a major safety
concern, while at the same time difficult to explain because
it involves a pilot controlling an airworthy aircraft that is
flown into terrain (water or obstacles) with inadequate pilot
awareness of the impending disaster.
One constant in CFIT accidents is that outside visibility is
limited, or the accident occurs at night and the terrain is not
seen easily until just prior to impact. Another commonality
among CFIT accidents is lack of SA. This includes not only
horizontal awareness, and knowing where the helicopter is
over the ground, but also vertical awareness.
Training, planning, and preparation are a pilot’s best defenses
for avoiding CFIT accidents. For example, take some time
before takeoff to become familiar with the proposed flight and
the terrain. Avoidance of CFIT begins before the helicopter
departs the home location. Proper planning, including applied
risk mitigation must occur before the aircraft is even started.
Thorough assessment of terrain, visibility, pilot experience
and available contingencies must be conducted. If necessary,
delay or postpone the flight while on the ground. The decision
to abort the flight is much easier to make in the planning room
than in the air. In case conditions deteriorate once in flight.
Have contingency options available.
While many CFIT accidents and incidents occur during
nonprecision approaches and landings, great measures have
been taken to improve instrument training, equipment and
procedures. For the qualified pilot, instrument flight should
not be avoided, but rather, trained as a viable option for safely
recovering the aircraft. Like any other training, frequent
instrument training builds confidence and reassurance.
Good instrument procedures include studying approach
charts before leaving cruise altitude. Key fixes and airport
elevation must be noted and associated with terrain and
obstacles along the approach path. Pilots should have a good
understanding of both approach and departure design criteria
to understand fully the obstacle clearance margins built into
them. Some pilots have the false belief that ATC provides
obstacle clearance while en route off airways. The pilot is
ultimately responsible for obstacle clearance.
Operational Pitfalls
Peer Pressure
It would be foolish and unsafe for a new pilot to attempt to compete with an older, more experienced pilot. The only safe competition
should be completing the most safe flights with no one endangered or hurt and the aircraft returned to service. Efficiency comes with
experience and on-the-job training.
Mindset
A pilot should be taught to approach every day as something new.
Get-There-Itis
This disposition impairs pilot judgment through a fixation on the original goal or destination, combined with a disregard for any
alternative course of action.
Duck-Under Syndrome
A pilot may be tempted to arrive at an airport by descending below minimums during an approach. There may be a belief that
there is a built-in margin of error in every approach procedure, or the pilot may not want to admit that the landing cannot be
completed and a missed approach must be initiated.
Scud Running
It is difficult for a pilot to estimate the distance from indistinct forms, such as clouds or fog formation.
Continuing Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Into Instrument Conditions
Spatial disorientation or collision with ground/obstacles may occur when a pilot continues VFR into instrument conditions. This can
be even more dangerous if the pilot is not instrument rated or current.
Getting Behind the Aircraft
This pitfall can be caused by allowing events or the situation to control pilot actions. A constant state of surprise at what happens
next may be exhibited when the pilot is “getting behind” the aircraft.
Loss of Positional or Situational Awareness
In extreme cases of a pilot getting behind the aircraft, a loss of positional or situational awareness may result. The pilot may not
know the aircraft’s geographical location, or may be unable to recognize deteriorating circumstances.
Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves
Pilots should use the last of the known fuel to make a safe landing. Bringing fuel to an aircraft is much less inconvenient than
picking up the pieces of a crashed helicopter! Pilots should land prior to whenever their watch, fuel gauge, low-fuel warning system,
or flight planning indicates fuel burnout. They should always be thinking of unforecast winds, richer-than-planned mixtures,
unknown leaks, mis-servicing, and errors in planning. Newer pilots need to be wary of fuselage attitudes in low-fuel situations.
Some helicopters can port air into the fuel system in low-fuel states, causing the engines to quit or surge.
Descent Below the Minimum En Route Altitude
The duck-under syndrome, as mentioned above, can also occur during the en route portion of an IFR flight.
Flying Outside the Envelope
The pilot must understand how to check the charts, understand the results, and fly accordingly.
Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
All pilots and operators must understand the complexity of the helicopter, the amazing number of parts, and why there are service
times associated with certain parts. Pilots should understand material fatigue and maintenance requirements. Helicopters are
unforgiving of disregarded maintenance requirements. Inspections and maintenance are in place for safety: something functioning
improperly can be the first link in the error chain to an accident. In some cases, proper maintenance is a necessary condition for
insurance converage.
Figure 13-9. Operational pitfalls.
Altitude error is another common cause of CFIT. Cases
of altitude error involve disorientation with respect to the
NAVAID, improper transition on approach, selecting the
wrong NAVAID, or just plain lack of horizontal SA. Today’s
modern aircraft have sophisticated flight directors, autopilots,
autothrottles, and flight management systems. These devices
make significant contributions to the overall safety of flight,
but they are only machines that follow instructions. They
do whatever is asked of them, even if it is wrong. When
commanded, they unerringly follow instructions—sometimes
straight into the ground. The pilot must ensure that both
vertical and horizontal modes are correct and engaged. Cross-
check autopilots constantly.