Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
the pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control during approach. The NTSB report, available here, also contains information
about this pilot’s decision-making and risk management.
11779
Many incidents and accidents occur as a result of poor risk management. The following accident review illustrates the importance
of risk-based decision-making, as a means to prevent a negative outcome.
Risk Management Analysis Using the PAVE Checklist
11780
The accident described above contains risk factors included in the PA VE checklist. As shown in Figure 1-2, the acronym
“PA VE” represents hazards that relate to the pilot, the aircraft, the environment, and external pressures. The sample analysis
below describes how PA VE items may relate to the accident.
A pilot must continually make decisions about competency,
condition of health, mental and emotional state, level of
fatigue, and many other variables. For example, a pilot may
be called early in the morning to make a long flight. If a pilot
has had only a few hours of sleep and is concerned that the
sinus congestion being experienced could be the onset of a
cold, it would be prudent to consider if the flight could be
accomplished safely.
A pilot had only 4 hours of sleep the night before
being asked by the boss to fly to a meeting in a city
750 miles away. The reported weather was marginal
and not expected to improve. After assessing fitness
as a pilot, it was decided that it would not be wise to
make the flight. The boss was initially unhappy, but
was later convinced by the pilot that the risks
involved were unacceptable.
Pilot
The environment encompasses many elements that are not
pilot or airplane related, including such factors as weather,
air traffic control (ATC), navigational aids (NAVAIDS), terrain,
takeoff and landing areas, and surrounding obstacles. Weather
is one element that can change drastically over time and
distance.
A pilot was landing a small airplane
just after a heavy jet had departed
a parallel runway. The pilot
assumed that wake turbulence
would not be a problem since
landings had been performed under
similar circumstances. Due to a
combination of prevailing winds
and wake turbulence from the
heavy jet drifting across the landing
runway, the airplane made a hard
landing. The pilot made an error
when assessing the flight
environment.
Environment
A pilot frequently bases decisions on evaluation of the
airplane, such as performance, equipment, or airworthiness.
During a preflight, a pilot noticed a small amount of oil dripping
from the bottom of the cowling. Although the quantity of oil
seemed insignificant at the time, the pilot decided to delay the
takeoff and have a mechanic check the source of the oil.
The pilot’s good judgment was confirmed when the mechanic
found that one of the oil cooler hose fittings was loose.
Aircraft
The interaction between the pilot, airplane, and the
environment is greatly influenced by the purpose of each
flight operation. The pilot must evaluate the three previous
areas to decide on the desirability of undertaking or continuing
the flight as planned. It is worth asking why the flight is being
made, how critical it is to maintain the schedule, and if the
trip is worth the risks.
On a ferry flight to deliver an airplane from the factory, the pilot
calculated the groundspeed and determined he would arrive at
the destination with only 10 minutes of fuel remaining. A check
of the weather revealed he would be flying into marginal
weather conditions. By asking himself whether it was more
critical to maintain the schedule or to arrive with an intact
aircraft, the pilot decided to schedule a refuel stop even though
it would mean he would not be able to keep to the schedule.
He chose not to “stretch” the fuel supply in marginal weather
conditions which could have resulted in an emergency landing.
External Pressures
Figure 1-2. The P AVE checklist.
12855
The pilot reported to air traffic control (ATC) that the vacuum pump failed while in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
As a result, the attitude indicator and directional gyro became inoperative. Rather than divert to an airport while in VMC, the
pilot decided to continue toward the destination and into instrument meteorological conditions ( IMC). This elevated the risks
associated with an “A” hazard because of the inoperative instruments and a “V” hazard because of the IMC. After the vacuum
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
pump failure, the pilot communicated with ATC that IMC would not be a problem, which may indicate a hazardous attitude or
“P” hazard. It is unknown if an external pressure or “E” hazard factored in the pilot’s apparent desire to get to the destination.
20855
In this case, the pilot had the opportunity to change the outcome of the flight by diverting to an airport while still in VMC. Several
reasons explain why pilots do not make appropriate decisions. Pilot error often results from an over-estimate of capability, a
lack of preparation for flight, or a failure to prioritize safety. Varying levels of risk tolerance, or even intentional disregard of
risk, may be a factor.
11784
Risk management training includes a variety of measures that change the way pilots perceive and deal with hazards both before
and during a flight. This handbook will emphasize using risk management as a process to avoid situations and decisions that
might lead to an aircraft accident.
Chapter Summary
11780
Poor risk management is a cause of many accidents. Accordingly, pilots should emphasize risk management in all types of
operations, from recreational flying to using aircraft for business.
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
Introduction
11815
Federal regulations that apply to aviation do not cover every situation nor do they guarantee safety. For example, a pilot may
legally fly in marginal VFR conditions at night even though low visibility and night hazards increase the risk for an incident or
accident. Therefore, pilots should consider non-mandatory self-regulation in the form of personal minimums.
Personal Minimums
12391
Pilots who understand the difference between what is “smart” or “safe” based on pilot experience and proficiency establish
personal minimums that are more restrictive than the regulatory requirements. The following six steps allow pilots to establish
a set of personal minimums in order to reduce risk and fly with greater confidence.
Step 1—Review Weather Flight Categories
12392
Establishing personal minimums normally begins with weather, and pilots should know the range of ceiling and visibility that
defines each category. [Figure 2-1]
12393
Visual Flight Rules
VFR
Marginal Visual Flight Rules
MVFR
Instrument Flight Rules
IFR
Low Instrument Flight Rules
LIFR
Category
Ceiling Visibility
and/or
and/or
and/or
andGreater than 3,000 feet AGL
1,000 to 3,000 feet AGL
500 to below 1,000 feet AGL
below 500 feet AGL
Greater than 5 miles
3 to 5 miles
1 mile to less than 3 miles
less than 1 mile
Figure 2-1. Weather category values for ceiling and visibility.
Step 2—Assess Experience and Comfort Level
12394
Pilots should also take a few minutes to complete the certification, training, and experience summary in Figure 2-2 by filling
in the right column. Some pilots fly different aircraft categories and classes and may develop different personal minimums
based on the specific aircraft flown. For example, many pilots will have a different set of personal minimums when flying a
single-engine airplane versus a multiengine airplane. Depending on pilot experience, the minimums in a multiengine airplane
could be higher than the single-engine airplane minimums. Pilots may use the information entered in Figure 2-2 to set personal
minimums for a variety of situations using tables in Figure 2-3, Figure 2-4, and Figure 2-5.
Chapter 2: Personal Minimums
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
12396
Certificate level
(e.g., private, commercial, ATP)
Ratings
(e.g., instrument, multiengine)
Endorsements
(e.g., complex, high performance, high altitude)
Total flying time
Years of flying experience
Flight review
(e.g., certificate, rating, wings)
Instrument Proficiency Check
Time since checkout in aircraft 1
Time since checkout in aircraft 2
Time since checkout in aircraft 3
Variation in equipment
(e.g., GPS navigators, autopilot)
Hours
Hours in this aircraft (or identical model)
Landings
Night hours
Night landings
Hours flown in high density altitude
Hours flown in mountainous terrain
Crosswind landings
IFR hours
IMC hours (actual conditions)
Approaches (actual or simulated)
Experience
Recent Experience (last 12 months)
Training Summary
Certification Level
Certification, Training, and Experience Summary
Figure 2-2. Certification, training, and experience summary.
12397
The tables in Figure 2-3, Figure 2-4, and Figure 2-5 layout a sample assessment. Figure 2-3 shows how entries might look in
the Experience & Comfort Level Assessment VFR & MVFR table. Suppose a pilot’s flying takes place in a part of the country
where clear skies and visibilities of 30 miles or more are normal. The entry might specify the lowest VFR ceiling as 7,000
feet, and the lowest visibility as 15 miles. A pilot may never experience MVFR conditions and would leave the dash in place.
However, in this example and as shown in Figure 2-3, the pilot regularly flies in an area where normal summer flying involves
hazy conditions over relatively flat terrain and is more experienced and comfortable in MVFR. The pilot used the MVFR
column to record personal minimums of a 2,500-foot ceiling and 4 miles visibility for daytime operations.
12399
For night flight, a ceiling under 3,000 feet or visibility less than 5 miles may create an unnecessary risk, so the pilot decided to
record a 5,000-foot ceiling and 8 miles visibility in the VFR column.
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
12401
Experience and “Comfort Level” Assessment
VFR & MVFR
Weather Condition
Ceiling
Day
Night
Visibility
Day
Night
VFR
> 3,000
—
5,000
> 5 miles
—
8 miles
MVFR
1,000–3,000
2,500
—
3–5 miles
4 miles
—
Figure 2-3. A sample pilot experience and comfort level assessment for VFR and MVFR.
12400
For IFR, Figure 2-4 shows how a pilot recorded the lowest IFR conditions recently and regularly experienced. Although a pilot
may have successfully flown in low IFR (LIFR) conditions, it does not mean the pilot was “comfortable” in these conditions. In
this example, the pilot did not fill in the LIFR boxes for known “comfort level” in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)
after deciding to avoid flight in those conditions.
12402
Experience and “Comfort Level” Assessment
IFR & LIFR
Weather Condition
Ceiling
Day
Night
Visibility
Day
Night
IFR
500–999
800
999
1–3 miles
1 mile
3 miles
LIFR
< 500
—
—
< 1 mile
—
—
Figure 2-4. A sample pilot experience and comfort level assessment for IFR and LIFR.
12403
If combined into a single table, the summary of a pilot’s known “comfort level” for VFR, MVFR, IFR, and LIFR weather
conditions might appear as shown in Figure 2-5.
12404
Experience and “Comfort Level” Assessment
Combined VFR & IFR
Weather Condition
Ceiling
Day
Night
Visibility
Day
Night
VFR
MVFR
IFR
LIFR
2,500
5,000
4 miles
8 miles
800
999
1 mile
3 miles
Figure 2-5. Experience and comfort level assessment for combined VFR and IFR.
Step 3—Consider Other Conditions
12405
Pilots should also have personal minimums for wind and turbulence and record the most challenging wind conditions comfortably
experienced during the last six to twelve months. As shown in Figure 2-6, a pilot may record these values for category and class,
or for a specific aircraft.
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
12406
Experience and “Comfort Level” Assessment
Wind & Turbulence
Surface wind speed
Surface wind gusts
Crosswind component
Turbulence
15 knots
8 knots
7
10 knots
5 knots
7
SE
ME
Make/
Model
Figure 2-6. A sample pilot experience and comfort level assessment for wind and turbulence.
12407
In addition to winds, “comfort level” inventory should also include factors related to aircraft performance. Completing the table
with reference to the aircraft type and terrain typical for most flying [Figure 2-7] will establish a safety buffer. If the pilot has
never operated an airplane from a runway shorter than 5,000 feet, the shortest runway box should say 5,000 feet.
12408
Experience and “Comfort Level” Assessment
Performance Factors
Shortest runway
Highest terrain
Highest density altitude
Performance
4,500
3,000
3,000
2,500
6,000
3,000
SE
ME
Make/
Model
Figure 2-7. Sample experience and comfort level assessment for performance factors.
Step 4—Assemble and Evaluate
12409
Combining all these numbers results in a baseline personal minimums table as shown in Figure 2-8.
12410
Baseline Personal Minimums
Weather Condition
Ceiling
Day
Night
Visibility
Day
Night
VFR
MVFR
IFR
LIFR
2,500
5,000
4 miles
8 miles
800
999
1 mile
3 miles
Surface wind speed
Surface wind gusts
Crosswind component
Turbulence
SE
ME
Make/
Model
15 knots
8 knots
7
10 knots
5 knots
7
Shortest runway
Highest terrain
Highest density altitude
Performance
SE
ME
Make/
Model
4,500
3,000
3,000
2,500
6,000
3,000
Figure 2-8. Sample baseline personal minimums.
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
Step 5—Adjust for Specific Conditions
12411
Any flight a pilot makes involves an infinite combination of pilot skill, experience, conditions, and proficiency. Aircraft
equipment and performance, environmental conditions, and external influences vary considerably. Both individually and in
combination, these factors can compress or expand the safety buffer provided by baseline personal minimums. Consequently,
a pilot should develop a practical way to adjust baseline personal minimums to accommodate specific conditions or aircraft.
12412
Note that the example situations and additional safety margins [Figure 2-9] only provide a starting point. Pilots may develop their
own adjustment factors based on experience, aircraft capabilities, and operation. If flying experience is limited or infrequent,
the adjustment magnitude could increase. If multiple special conditions apply, a pilot could make an adjustment for each factor.
For example, suppose a pilot plans a night cross-country flight to an unfamiliar airport, departing after a full workday. The table
in Figure 2-9 suggests raising baseline personal minimums by adding 1,000 feet to the ceiling value, one mile to visibility, and
1,000 feet to required runway length.
12413
Pilot
Aircraft
enVironment
External
Pressures
Illness, use of medication, stress, or fatigue; lack of
currency (e.g., have not flown for several weeks)
An unfamiliar airplane or an aircraft with unfamiliar
avionics or other equipment
Unfamiliar airports and airspace; different terrain or
other unfamiliar characteristics
“Must meet” deadlines, pressures from
passengers, etc.
If you are facing Adjust baseline personal minimums by
Adding at least 500 feet to ceiling
Adding at least 1/2 mile to visibility
Adding at least 500 feet to runway length
Subtracting at least 5 knots from winds
Figure 2-9. Examples of additional safety margins from baseline personal minimums.
12414
Here are several important cautions regarding personal minimums. The pilot should:
12415
1. Not adjust personal minimums to complete a specific flight. The time to consider adjustments is not while under
pressure to fly, but rather when time and objectivity permits an honest self-analysis about skill, performance, and
comfort level during the last few flights.
12416
2. Make adjustments to one variable at a time. For example, if the goal is to lower baseline personal minimums for
visibility; the ceiling, wind, or other values should not change at the same time.
20842
3. Seek training and consult with a flight instructor before making a significant adjustment to personal minimums.
Step 6—Stick to the Plan
12417
As many pilots know, adhering to personal minimums sometimes creates an ethical dilemma, especially when pressures exist
to make a flight. Professional pilots live by the numbers, and so should general aviation pilots. Established personal minimums
enable the pilot to make a no-go or divert decision rather than departing with a sense of unease regarding the outcome of a flight.
In addition, a written set of personal minimums can also make it easier to explain tough decisions to passengers who depend
on the pilot’s judgment.
Using the FAA WINGS Program for Risk Mitigation & Safety
20856
The FAA maintains a safety program that provides courses on a variety of topics as a means to enhance safety. The WINGS
Pilot Proficiency Program is based on the premise that pilots who maintain currency and proficiency will enjoy a safer and more
stress-free flying experience. As an added bonus, completion of a phase of the WINGS Program can count for a flight review
and participants may receive a discount on certain flight insurance policies. Pilots may create an account and watch a WINGS
video using the following links:
12856
• FAA WINGS Program
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
20871
• WINGS Pilot Proficiency Program Video
Chapter Summary
12418
Many GA pilots have freedom to choose when and where they fly. However, this freedom may also lead pilots to situations
where lack of proficiency and equipment capability become a factor. Responsible pilots set personal minimums to help reduce
the probability of experiencing an encounter that could lead to an incident or accident.
12419
A copy of the charts used in this chapter can be found in Appendix B, Risk Assessment Tools. Pilots are encouraged to copy and
use the charts in the appendix or use comparable tools on an electronic flight bag (EFB) before each flight.
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
Introduction
11788
The words “hazard” and “risk” seem simple, but these words are easily confused. 14 CFR part 5, section 5.5 defines these two
terms as follows:
11789
• Hazard – a condition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in 49 CFR part 830,
section 830.2.
11790
• Risk – the composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a hazard.
14611
Simply put, a hazard is a condition that could cause an accident. The probability and predicted severity of the consequences
that may result from any hazard is the risk. Identifying, analyzing, and responding appropriately to hazards decreases the risks
and increases the margin of safety.
Hazard Exposure
11787
The example of a person crossing a street helps explain the relationship between hazard and risk. The traffic is always a hazard,
but it does not usually create a significant risk for a pedestrian until the actual street crossing takes place.
11793
Some people may lack the experience needed to understand the hazards and risks associated with crossing a busy street and
need to learn the procedures used to cross streets safely. In a similar way, pilots need to identify aviation hazards and associated
risks and learn to deal with them appropriately. However, when assuming pilot-in-command duties, pilots encounter a variety of
hazards, and they may not recognize the potential for an accident in a given situation. Pilots need the ability to perceive relevant
hazards, understand and analyze potential consequences, and exercise judgment when responding to any hazard.
Why Hazards Result in Aviation Accidents
14612
Pilots learn to recognize hazards during ground and flight training. While instructors normally include the learner in the decision-
making process, training does not teach the learner how to manage every hazard. A saying goes that new pilots have a cup of
luck and an empty cup of experience, and they should fill the cup of experience before their cup of luck runs out. However, all
pilots should understand that any situation involving a hazard may present a significant risk to their safety. Rather than relying
on luck, the correct response to a given hazard often depends on many variables and calls for a disciplined analysis and response.
The following case studies illustrate this point.
14613
A pilot with approximately 233 hours of total time rented an unfamiliar airplane for a round-trip VFR cross-country flight. The
pilot had about 2.6 hours of time in the specific make and model. The NTSB narrative indicates the following:
14614
According to the operator of the airplane, the pilot had difficulty starting the engine prior to departing for Erie
International/Tom Ridge Field (KERI), and requested assistance. The operator proceeded out to the airplane, and
showed the pilot how to start the engine. The operator then suggested the pilot leave Erie with enough time to return to
Waterbury-Oxford Airport (KOXC) before sunset. Later in the day, the pilot called the operator and informed him that
the airplane operated fine on the flight to Erie, and he would be back at Waterbury-Oxford by 19:00.
14615
The pilot actually departed Erie at night. There was a fatal crash and the NTSB probable cause states:
14616
The loss of partial engine power for undetermined reasons, and the pilot’ s loss of control after performing an evasive
maneuver to avoid trees during a forced landing at night. Factors related to the accident were a rough running engine
and the pilots inability to see the trees due to the nighttime conditions. The NTSB accident details are available here.
14618
While not common, even professionally trained pilots sometimes fail to recognize and respond to hazards and associated risks.
An airline accident involving a transport category turbojet taken to its maximum operating altitude resulted in both engines
flaming out after an aerodynamic stall. The flight ended in a crash and two fatalities. The NTSB probable cause(s) follows:
14619
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: (1) the pilots’
unprofessional behavior, deviation from standard operating procedures, and poor airmanship, which resulted in an
in-flight emergency from which they were unable to recover, in part because of the pilots’ inadequate training; (2)
the pilots’ failure to prepare for an emergency landing in a timely manner, including communicating with air traffic
controllers immediately after the emergency about the loss of both engines and the availability of landing sites; and (3)
Chapter 3: Identifying Hazards & Associated
Risks
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
the pilots’ improper management of the double engine failure checklist, which allowed the engine cores to stop rotating
and resulted in the core lock engine condition. Contributing to this accident were (1) the core lock engine condition,
which prevented at least one engine from being restarted, and (2) the airplane flight manuals that did not communicate
to pilots the importance of maintaining a minimum airspeed to keep the engine cores rotating. The NTSB accident
details are available here.
Understanding the Risks Posed by Hazards
4045
A predisposition to respond to persons, situations, or events in a given manner reveals a person’s attitude. Studies have identified
five hazardous attitudes that can affect a pilot’s ability to make sound decisions and exercise authority properly. [Figure 3-1]
4046
The Five Hazardous Attitudes
Anti-authority: “Don’t tell me.”
This attitude is found in people who do not like anyone telling them what to do. In a sense, they are saying, “No one can tell me
what to do.” They may be resentful of having someone tell them what to do or may regard rules, regulations, and procedures as
silly or unnecessary. However, it is always pilot prerogative to question authority if it seems to be in error.
Impulsivity: “Do it quickly.”
This is the attitude of people who frequently feel the need to do something—anything—immediately. They do not stop to think about
what they are about to do; they do not select the best alternative; and they do the first thing that comes to mind.
Invulnerability: “It won’t happen to me.”
Many people believe that accidents happen to others, but never to them. They know accidents can happen, and they know that
anyone can be affected. They never really feel or believe that they will be personally involved. Pilots who think this way are more likely
to take chances and increase risk.
Macho: “I can do it.”
Pilots who are always trying to prove that they are better than anyone else are thinking, “I can do it, I’ll show them.” Pilots with this
type of attitude will try to prove themselves by taking risks in order to impress others. While this pattern is thought to be a male
characteristic, women are equally susceptible.
Resignation: “What’s the use?”
Pilots who think, “What’s the use?” do not see themselves as being able to make a great deal of difference in what happens to them.
When things go well, the pilot is apt to think that it is good luck. When things go badly, the pilot may feel that “someone is out to get
me,” or attribute it to bad luck. The pilot will leave the action to others, for better or worse. Sometimes, such pilots will even go along
with unreasonable requests just to be a “nice guy.”
Figure 3-1. Pilots should examine their decisions carefully to ensure that their choices have not been influenced by a
hazardous attitude.
14620
Most pilots sincerely believe that they will respond to hazards appropriately and take actions necessary to avoid accidents.
However, a pilot’s attitude affects perception of hazards, the analysis of the potential threat, and performance of an appropriate
response.
14621
Since attitude influences behavior, pilots should consider their own attitude and the antidote to any hazardous attitude. [Figure
3-2] The pilots in the two fatal accidents described above exhibited several of these hazardous attitudes. If they had recognized
their attitude toward the hazards and associated risks and considered that their behavior could result in an accident, it is very
likely that they would have acted differently (invulnerability). If the general aviation pilot had waited and returned the next
day, he might be alive today (impulsivity). The commercial pilots wanted to claim they had flown the aircraft at its maximum
altitude (macho). Pilot attitudes regarding hazard analysis clearly play a role in decision-making.
3-2