Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
4048
Hazardous Attitude Antidotes
Macho
Steve often brags to his friends about his skills
as a pilot and how close to the ground he flies.
During a local pleasure flight in his single-
engine airplane, he decides to buzz some
friends barbecuing at a nearby park.
Anti-authority
Although he knows that flying so low to the
ground is prohibited by the regulations, he
feels that the regulations are too restrictive in
some circumstances.
Invulnerability
Steve is not worried about an accident since
he has flown this low many times before, and
he has not had any problems.
Impulsivity
As he is buzzing the park, the airplane does
not climb as well as Steve had anticipated, and
without thinking, he pulls back hard on the
yoke. The airspeed drops, and the airplane is
close to stalling as the wing brushes a power
line.
Resignation
Although Steve manages to recover, the wing
sustains minor damage. Steve thinks to himself,
“It doesn’t really matter how much effort I put
in—the end result is the same whether I really
try or not.”
Taking
chances is
foolish.
Follow the
rules. They
help prevent
accidents.
It could
happen
to me.
Not so fast.
Think first.
I’m not
helpless.
I can make
a difference.
Figure 3-2. Antidotes to hazardous attitudes.
Leading Accident Causes
11800
The aviation accident record has improved considerably in recent years, but the reduction in accident rates has not been uniform
across the aviation community. For example, the accident rate for air carriers operating under 14 CFR part 121 was reduced by
nearly 80 percent in the ten-year period beginning in the mid-1990s. In contrast, general aviation aircraft operating under 14
CFR part 91 maintained a static accident rate of about one fatal accident per 100,000 flight hours.
11801
The FAA and the general aviation community collaborate through the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC),
to suggest safety enhancements that could reduce accidents. As part of this effort, the GAJSC analyzed hundreds of general
aviation accidents and evaluated the causal factors. The FAA Fact Sheet on General Aviation Safety ranks the following ten
leading causes of general aviation fatal accidents during the period 2001-2016:
11802
1. Loss of control in-flight (LOC-I)
14624
2. Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)
14625
3. System component failure–powerplant
14626
4. Fuel related
14627
5. Unknown or undetermined
14628
6. System component failure–non powerplant
14629
7. Unintended flight into IMC
14630
8. Midair collisions
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
14631
9. Low-altitude operations
14632
10. Other
11803
The top four causes of general aviation fatal accidents include loss of control in-flight (LOC-I), controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT), system component failure of the powerplant (SCF-PP), and fuel-related issues. These causes often signify the final
result of a chain of events. However, an in-depth analysis of these accidents will often reveal inadequate risk management as a
common thread. To begin with, pilots should recognize hazards linked to causes of aircraft accidents as presented below:
11806
1. Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I)–Examples of loss of control scenarios include continued VFR into IMC, wake
turbulence upsets, thunderstorm encounters, instrument failure, improper aircraft loading, loss of outside references
during flight at night or over water, and conditions that exceed the pilot’s capability.
11807
2. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)–CFIT often results from continued VFR flight into areas with a low ceiling or
low visibility, flight at night, incorrect interpretation of a chart, flight at high density altitude, flight in mountainous
terrain, or intentionally flying too low.
11808
3. System Component Failure Powerplant (SCF-PP)–This category includes a variety of hazards, some which the pilot or
operator may not easily identify. If a pilot experiences difficulty with an engine run-up or experiences an engine issue
after maintenance, a significant hazard may exist.
11805
4. Fuel-Related–Pilots still experience fuel starvation or fuel exhaustion. Misunderstanding or mishandling the aircraft's
fuel system, a lack of adequate planning, trying to stretch aircraft fuel range, or an unwillingness to take the time or
make the effort to stop for fuel contributes to this type of accident.
Identifying Hazards
11809
There are several ways pilots can detect hazards. Pilots should use combinations of methods to detect hazards, including the
following:
11810
• Visual Observation–A pilot’s observations provide a primary means to identify hazards. For example, a pilot can
visually observe thunderstorms and maintain a safe distance from them. A pilot who can see terrain can maneuver to
avoid it.
11811
• Preflight Planning–Many hazards can be detected through preflight planning. Weather briefings identify hazards.
Aircraft performance calculations, preflight inspections, and other routine procedures may identify hazards.
11812
• On-board Equipment–The availability of lower-cost modern avionics has improved situational awareness in many
general aviation aircraft. Technologies such as GPS-based moving map navigation, datalink weather, traffic displays,
terrain displays, and synthetic vision help pilots recognize different hazards.
11813
• Radio Communication–V oice radio provides an effective means to find out about hazards. Communication with air
traffic controllers and flight service specialists can provide real-time information on weather, air traffic, airspace
activity, and other hazards.
11814
• Postflight Inspections–Inspecting the aircraft following the completion of a flight may identify aircraft hazards before
the next person flies the aircraft. Common items include condition of tires and brakes, security of access panels and
latches, and leaking operating fluids. Properly securing the aircraft may prevent damage, which could affect the next
flight.
Using the PAVE Checklist to Identify Hazards
11816
As described in Chapter 1, the PA VE checklist provides a means to identify hazards using four convenient hazard “buckets.”
Using all four checklist categories before a flight captures most hazards normally encountered. This section discusses hazards
associated with each category.
Pilot Hazards
11818
“P” hazards can be classified in terms of both capability and aeromedical factors as follows:
11819
1. Qualification–Does the pilot possess the appropriate pilot certificate, category, class, and type rating needed to operate
a specific aircraft under the given set of conditions? Some accidents have occurred when pilots have attempted to
operate under IFR without holding an instrument rating. A few accidents occur every year when the pilot did not
possess any airman certificate.
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
11820
2. Currency–Has the pilot logged the minimum number of takeoffs and landings and instrument approaches, flight
reviews, or other currency events required by 14 CFR? Are the currency requirements sufficient to guarantee that the
pilot will be able to handle the flight requirements?
11821
3. Proficiency–Does the pilot have the ability to manage the conditions expected during flight? For example, suppose
a pilot plans an IFR flight with forecast of low ceilings. Under 14 CFR part 61, the pilot needs to have logged six
instrument approaches, holding, and tracking within the previous six calendar months to be IFR current. However, if
these currency events occurred five months ago, the pilot may lack the proficiency to make the flight safely. If a pilot
flies an unfamiliar aircraft, does the pilot have the ability to use the avionics and systems efficiently and properly?
Aeromedical
11822
Aeromedical hazards relate to physical and emotional readiness for flight including:
11823
• Illness–Does a pilot suffer from initial symptoms, ongoing illness, or any aftereffects? Even mild symptoms may be
sufficiently debilitating to create a “P” hazard.
11824
• Medication–Could any medications the pilot takes affect the flight? Both prescription and non-prescription over-the-
counter (OTC) drugs have side effects that can affect a pilot’s physical and mental performance. The FAA provides
information regarding OTC drugs here.
11825
• Stress–Has a stressful life situation affected the pilot? Many personal or business events and activities can cause
stress. Stress has many manifestations and affects thinking, behavior, and health.
11826
• Alcohol–Has the pilot consumed alcohol recently? The CFRs include a time limit (no consumption within eight hours
before a flight), a quantity limit (blood alcohol must be below 0.04 percent), and a performance limit (flight duty
prohibited while under the influence of alcohol). Aftereffects of alcohol consumption (dehydration, hangover, and
headaches, etc.) may trigger a “P” hazard for longer than eight hours after consumption.
11827
• Fatigue–How alert is the pilot? Fatigue may result from insufficient sleep. However, sufficient sleep only corrects
acute fatigue. Chronic fatigue may involve multiple factors and requires additional analysis and remedy. Fatigue can
be intensified by hypoxia as well as emotional state. While fatigued pilots have fallen asleep while flying, the effects
of fatigue may be subtle. For example, fatigue may degrade cognitive skills and decision-making ability.
11828
• Emotion–Has the pilot experienced an event or received information that creates strong feelings? Emotions may
affect normal pilot ability to focus.
11829
The IMSAFE checklist, which is an acronym for Illness, Medication, Stress, Alcohol, Fatigue, and Emotion, can help a pilot
identify these hazards. [Figure 3- 3] Note that some publications combine Emotion with Stress as the “S” in IMSAFE and leave
the “E” to remind pilots about “Eating.” Since proper nutrition and hydration affects wellness and safety, a pilot planning a long
flight should consider appropriate food and water intake and supply.
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
11830
Illness—Do I have any symptoms?
Medication—Have I been taking prescription or
over-the-counter drugs?
Stress—Am I under psychological pressure from
the job? Worried about financial matters, health
problems, or family discord?
Alcohol—Have I been drinking within 8 hours?
Within 24 hours?
Fatigue—Am I tired and not adequately rested?
Emotion—Am I emotionally upset?
I'M SAFE CHECKLIST
Figure 3-3. IMSAFE checklist.
Aircraft Hazards
11831
“A” hazards can be classified in terms of both performance and equipage.
Performance
11832
Aircraft performance hazards may include:
11833
• Fuel and Range–As previously described, fuel issues continue to be a leading cause of general aviation accidents.
Planning a flight to the aircraft’s maximum range magnifies this “A” hazard. Inaccurate calculations, changing
conditions, or the aircraft’s failure to achieve “book” speeds and fuel consumption can lead to an incident or accident.
11834
• Takeoff and Landing Performance– Takeoffs and landings become more hazardous when the calculated performance
approaches the available runway length.
11835
• Altitude Performance–Operating to or from high altitude airports or cruising at high altitudes may result in a lack of
performance. In some cases, this lack of performance may not allow for a safe departure. In situations where a climb
could avoid a weather or terrain hazard, the lack of performance might contribute to an incident or accident.
11836
• Payload–Does an aircraft have the capability to carry the passengers, baggage, cargo, and fuel for a planned flight? In
addition, operating near maximum takeoff weight reduces climb performance.
11837
• Weight and Balance–Pilots who do not check center of gravity limits may experience difficulty trimming or
controlling the aircraft, which could lead to a loss of control in-flight.
Equipage
11838
The avionics and other equipment installed in an aircraft affect both utility and the ease with which a pilot can identify hazards.
Equipment considerations include:
11839
• Redundancy–Could equipment failure affect the type of flight contemplated? For example, on a day VFR flight in
Class E airspace, having only a single navigation/communication radio is not a major concern. However, for a flight
in IMC, having one radio could be considered an “A” hazard. Instrument failure is also a concern in IMC or at night,
and backup systems could prevent an accident.
11840
• Autopilot–Operating an aircraft in IMC without an autopilot increases pilot workload. A pilot flying an aircraft in
these conditions might consider aircraft without an autopilot an “A” hazard.
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
11841
• Inoperative Equipment–Inoperative equipment triggers an “A” hazard. For example, an inoperative landing light may
make night operation more hazardous, even though a landing light is not required for Part 91 operations when not for
hire. A pilot should consider the effect of inoperative equipment in relation to expected flight conditions.
Environmental Hazards
11842
The environment or “V” hazard encompasses weather, terrain, airports, airspace, time of day, and other factors.
Weather
11843
Of all the environmental hazards, weather is the most variable. However, improvements in aviation weather forecasts and
improvements in technology make it easier to identify weather hazards.
11844
• Thunderstorms and Convective Activity–Thunderstorms and their associated weather represent a severe hazard to all
aviation activities. Severe turbulence, hail, and other phenomena can create the potential for loss of control and may
result in structural failure of the aircraft.
11845
• Icing–Icing conditions constitute a hazard, and in-flight ice accretion has resulted in numerous loss of control
accidents. Frost, ice, or snow adhering to the aircraft on the ground, if not removed, can also be a hazard.
11846
• Low Ceilings and Visibility–At times, conditions below minimums can extend beyond the range of an IFR flight.
Continued VFR flight into IMC continues to cause accidents.
11847
• Turbulence and Winds–Severe turbulence aloft, although not common, can result in loss of control and may lead to
aircraft structural failure. Surface winds also constitute a hazard. For example, a crosswind that exceeds an aircraft’s
demonstrated maximum crosswind component or the pilot’s ability may result in loss of control on the ground
(LOC-G).
Terrain
11848
Terrain and surface features are a significant hazard to all aircraft. In extreme cold or high pressure, height above ground
and obstacles may be less than indicated. Pilots following instrument approach procedures have also been involved in CFIT
accidents.
11849
• Mountains, Hills, and Elevated Terrain–Mountainous terrain affects departure, en route, and arrival operations.
Numerous airports in the western United States require the use of special procedures.
11850
• Density Altitude–The combination of high temperature and high elevation affects aircraft performance. High density
altitude is a “V” hazard that affects takeoffs, climbs, and landings.
11851
• Over-water Operation–Takeoff at night over a large body of water can create a “black hole” effect and require the
pilot to immediately shift to control by instruments. Operating over water may not provide a suitable surface for an
emergency landing.
Facilities
11852
The departure and arrival facilities pilots use contain various hazards, and these can be aggravated by other environmental
factors.
11853
• Airports–Runway dimensions may not be sufficient such that a takeoff or landing can be performed safely under the
given conditions.
11855
• Runway Contamination–Wet or snow-covered runways are an environmental hazard. Some airplane flight manuals
(AFM) provide little or no guidance on how to modify takeoff and landing distances for contaminated runways.
15089
• Heliports–The aircraft rotor diameter may exceed the space available.
15092
• Seaplane Bases–Conditions that allow for landing may not be sufficient for takeoff. Obstructions may exist below the
water and could be affected by tides. Rough water or glassy water conditions may exist.
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
11854
• Approach Aids and Lighting–A facility without working approach aids and lighting for a given set of operating
conditions is a “V” hazard.
Airspace, Air Traffic Control, and Other Aircraft
11856
Airspace requirements and ATC services facilitate safe and efficient operations. However, under some circumstances, their
presence or absence constitutes a “V” hazard.
11857
• Prohibited and Restricted Airspace–Different airspace designations and restrictions are meant to protect pilots and
aircraft from hazards. For example, entering a prohibited or restricted area without permission can result in conflicts
with military aircraft.
11858
• ATC Delays and Service Availability–The ATC system may require route changes or holding, which may require
more fuel than expected.
11859
• Air Traffic Density and Collision Hazards–Pilots are responsible for seeing and avoiding other aircraft when flying
under VFR or in VMC while flying under IFR. However, under certain conditions, it is difficult to see other aircraft
because of haze, sunlight, aircraft position, blind spots, and other factors.
Night Operations
11860
Night operations make it more difficult to see and identify other hazards.
11861
• VFR operations–Visual operations are often hampered by visibility restrictions at night. This restricts a pilot’s ability
to see and avoid terrain and obstacles, other aircraft, precipitation, and other hazards.
11862
• Single-engine operations–A forced landing at night may require a pilot to deal with unexpected terrain hazards. In
addition, the failure of engine accessories, such as an alternator, may lead to total electrical failure.
External Pressure Hazards
11863
External pressures or “E” hazards originate from a variety of personal and business reasons. The pressure to get to a particular
destination or to leave at the conclusion of a planned stay can affect a pilot’s judgment. Pilots subject to external pressures
sometimes fail to consider the other three major categories of hazards.
11865
• Why does the pilot need to fly to a particular destination at a given time? Wanting to be present at a family
celebration, wishing to see a terminally ill relative, or the need to be at an important meeting can affect pilot
motivation. It may be a simple matter of not wanting to disappoint someone waiting at the destination. It could also
include a condition that arises during a flight, such as a sick passenger.
11866
• If a general aviation aircraft is used for business travel, a pilot may experience time pressure after committing to
be somewhere at a given time. Business flights place additional pressure on the pilot to conduct the “mission,”
regardless of the hazards and conditions.
Hazard Combinations
15201
Pilots often need to consider the effect of interactions with several hazards at the same time.
11794
Imagine that a pilot operates from the Elkins-Randolph County airport in Elkins, West Virginia (KEKN). This airport sits in a
valley at an elevation of 1,987 feet. The terrain and obstacles on the east and west sides rise to as high as 3,631 feet. The images
in Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 show a photograph and a sectional aeronautical chart excerpt of the Elkins airport.
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
11795
Figure 3-4. Elkins, WV airport.
11796
Figure 3-5. Sectional chart excerpt of Elkins, WV airport.
11797
The mountains and obstructions on both sides of the Elkins airport are a hazard. However, on a day with good visibility, few
clouds, and light winds, the associated risks are low for most aircraft engaged in visual flight rules (VFR) operations.
11798
If the Elkins airport scenario changes to a night operation, the level of risk associated with the combination of hazards increases,
and an accident becomes more likely. Pilots exposed to these multiple hazards need to consider the equipment, skill, and
experience necessary to operate safely.
Hazards and Associated Risks
11867
While interaction with a hazard can cause an accident, the level of risk associated with the hazard depends on composite of the
likelihood for the type of accident and the expected severity of injury as a result of such an accident. Depending on a particular
flight mission, each individual risk may be acceptable or unacceptable. In general aviation operations, the tolerance for risk is
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
generally low, and pilots should use risk assessment and management tools to mitigate any unacceptable risk before embarking
on a flight.
Using a Flight Risk Assessment Tool (FRAT)
11868
Identifying hazards and associating them with risks can be accomplished using a simple spreadsheet or form during flight
planning. The form used to record each hazard is known as a Flight Risk Assessment Tool (FRAT).
Numerical FRATs
11870
A numerical FRAT lists different hazards and an associated number, which indicates the significance of each hazard. The pilot
selects the relevant hazards, and derives a total score. Typically, the score falls into three ranges. If the total score is below a
certain minimum, the FRAT indicates low risk. If it is in an intermediate range, the pilot is advised to “exercise caution.” If the
score is above an upper threshold, the FRAT indicates danger. [Figure 3-6]
15200
RISK ASSESSMENT
Column total
Column total
SLEEP
1. Did not sleep well or less than 8 hours
2. Slept well
2
0
HOW DO YOU FEEL?
1. Have a cold or ill
2. Feel great
3. Feel a bit off
4
0
2
WEATHER AT TERMINATION
1. Greater than 5 miles visibility and 3,000 feet
ceilings
2. At least 3 miles visibility and 1,000 feet ceilings,
but less than 3,000 feet ceilings and 5 miles
visibility
3. IMC conditions
1
3
4
HOW IS THE DAY GOING?
1. Seems like one thing after another (late,
making errors, out of step)
2. Great day
3
0
IS THE FLIGHT
1. Day?
2. Night?
1
3
PLANNING
1. Rush to get off ground
2. No hurry
3. Used charts and computer to assist
4. Used computer program for all planning Yes
No
5. Did you verify weight and balance? Yes
No
6. Did you evaluate performance? Yes
No
7. Do you brief your passengers on the Yes
ground and in flight? No
3
1
0
3
0
0
3
0
3
0
2
Pilot’s Name Flight From To
TOTAL SCORE
0 10 20 30Not complex flight Exercise caution Area of concern
Endangerment
Low risk
Figure 3-6. Example of a numerical FRAT.
25487/11871
The FAA provides a numerical FRAT here. While this type of FRAT is easy to use, it has several drawbacks, including:
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
11872
1. The form may not cover all the hazards for a particular flight.
11873
2. The range of scores for each risk level may appear arbitrary, leading a pilot to question the results.
11874
3. The form does not encourage the pilot to analyze each hazard. For example, what is the likelihood the condition will
lead to an accident and what is the potential accident severity?
11875
4. The form may indicate an overall low level of risk, leading the pilot to ignore the implications of a particular hazard.
Narrative FRATs
11876
This type of FRAT asks the user to identify hazards and associate each hazard with risk. While taking more time to complete,
it addresses many of the disadvantages of a numerical FRAT. After identifying the hazards, the process includes a thorough
analysis and management of each risk.
11877
The following example of a narrative FRAT has the pilot determine the likelihood and severity for each hazard identified using
the PA VE checklist [Figure 3-6]. After further analysis, the pilot can determine how to manage each risk. This concept will be
explored further in the next chapter.
11878
Flight Risk Assessment Tool
PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results
Pilot “P”
Aircraft “A”
Environment “V”
External Pressure “E”
Capability
Aeromedical
Fuel/Range/Payload
Equipment
Performance
Personal
Business
Weather
Terrain
Airspace, ATC, Airports
Night/Over Water
Figure 3-7. Example Flight Risk Assessment Tool.
Case Study
11883
One way to understand the risk management process is to put it in a real-world context using a case study. The following
example will be used in this chapter, as well as Chapters 4 and 5, to illustrate a process to identify hazards, assess the associated
risks, and mitigate the risks as needed.
Background and Setting
11884
It is early on Friday, July 1, and Tricia just finished a successful week of consulting for clients in Portland, Boise, Dallas,
and Albuquerque. She flew to these locations from her home base in Santa Rosa, California (KSTS) using her single-engine
airplane. She had planned to return directly to Santa Rosa, but yesterday evening, her friends from Santa Rosa, Matt and Martha
Smith, invited her to spend the weekend in Durango, Colorado where they have a condominium. She gladly accepted their
invitation because she would enjoy seeing them.
11885
The flight from Albuquerque to Durango during the day on Friday goes smoothly. Tricia lands at the Animas Air Park (00C),
rather than the Durango-La Plata County Airport (KDRO) because the Smith’s condo is less than a mile from Animas Air Park,
toward town. Figure 3-8 shows a sectional chart excerpt from the Durango area.
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Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2A)
11886
Figure 3-8. Aeronautical chart excerpt showing Durango, CO.
11887
Tricia and the Smiths are enjoying the warm-weather weekend with rafting, cycling, and hiking as featured activities. The
Smiths are well-established in the Durango social scene, and the three friends go to parties on Friday and Saturday night,
with another one scheduled for Sunday night. Finally, on Monday, July 4, there will be a city-sponsored Independence Day
celebration where the Smiths will officiate.
11888
It is now late afternoon on Sunday. Tricia and the Smiths are back in their condo relaxing and discussing the weekend.
Coincidentally, both Tricia and Martha Smith just received urgent emails from their separate home offices in Santa Rosa, CA,
alerting them to critical meetings that are scheduled for Tuesday afternoon–Tricia’s at 4 pm and Martha’s at 3 pm. Matt tries to
book airline tickets from Durango to Santa Rosa for Tuesday morning, and with a worried look, he announces that there are no
airline seats available until Wednesday, at the earliest.
11889
Martha Smith then asks Tricia, “Would you be willing to fly us home in your airplane on Tuesday morning? This would allow
us all to enjoy the Monday celebration and the party Monday night before taking off early on Tuesday.” Tricia replies, “I need
to review the weather and do some other planning first, and we can all meet in a couple of hours.”
11890
Tricia goes back to her room and begins her analysis. First, she looks at the route that she might take home. Originally, she
planned a direct VFR flight back to Santa Rosa, a nonstop flight of 711 nautical miles, as depicted in the sectional chart excerpt
in Figure 3-9.
3-12